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INTRODUCTION

Heralding a new 12,000 kilometer guarantee, a laconic advertisement reads: "Harley-Davidson gives the competition yet another chance to imitate."1 This advertisement is less an example
of Madison Avenue wizardry than a sardonic statement about a
problem of international scope and pervasive significance-counterfeiting brand name merchandise (commercial
counterfeiting). Although Levi Strauss & Company Chairman
Walter A. Haas, Jr. quipped "[ilmitation is the highest form of
1. Kaikati & LaGarce, Beware of InternationalBrand Piracy, HRv. Bus.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 53, 58.
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flattery . . .," the dangers posed to legitimate manufacturers3
and the consuming public4 by counterfeit items has promoted heroic, albeit uncoordinated efforts to eliminate the problem. 5 These
efforts have recently coalesced through the promotion by various

international corporations of an international anticounterfeiting
code.6 The United States, the European Common Market (EEC),
Canada, and Japan are currently considering a draft convention
entitled "Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation
of Counterfeit Goods ' ' 7 (hereinafter referred to as the Anticounterfeiting Code or Code) which is designed to minimize the
international problem posed by counterfeit merchandise. This
Note highlights the international legal significance of the counterfeiting problem. Previous attempts to confront the problem provide the backdrop for a tripartite analysis which treats the following issues in the proposed Code: workability questions evident
from an initial examination of the Code; the Code as a norm-creating vehicle; and, aside from the normative properties of the
Code, the practical import of the Code for the international business community.
If the Code is to have more than chimerical value, it must either possess independent significance as a norm-creating vehicle
or help to coordinate the public and private international law aspects of the counterfeiting problem. If the Code rules are perceived to be efficacious, it will attract enough signatories to have
norm-creating potential. If nonsignatories then perceive the Code
to be a sufficiently authoritative source of workable rules, they
will integrate those rules into their national and legal value structures. Even if the Code does not succeed in creating international
norms, it may popularize efficient methods of dealing with coun-

terfeiters. Although both nations and businesses will benefit from
adoption of the Code, only nations can ratify the Code or embrace its rules. Their perceptions of the efficaciousness of the

2. How Levis Cracked a Ring of Counterfeiters,Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1977, at
27 [hereinafter cited as Ring of Counterfeiters].
3. See infra notes 34-62 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 92-157 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 98-139 and accompanying text.
7. Telephone Interview with Ms. Kathryn Flynn, Office of the United States
Trade Representative-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Affairs (Feb. 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Flynn Interview I]. For further discussion of potential Code signatories, see infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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Code will thus determine whether the Code develops into customary rules of commercial interaction.
Unfortunately, most formalist theory lacks an adequate jurisprudential approach for ascertaining the perceptions which the
Code will evoke among nonsignatories. A group of neo-realists including Myres McDougal, the late Harold Lasswell, and Michael
Reisman have developed a contextual analysis of the decision
making process. Because this multidisciplinary, contextual approach requires consideration of the same elements which influence political decision making, it provides the framework for ascertaining nonsignatory decisionmakers' perceptions of the Code.
This Note concludes that the practical considerations which militate against the workability of the Code will also minimize any
norm-creating properties which the Code might possess. The
Code represents a unique confluence of public and private international activities. Its significance is not dependent upon its
norm-creating properties alone, but also upon the cooperation
which the Code promotes among private international entities.
Commercial counterfeiting is the counterfeiting of brand name,
trademarked merchandise. The Code is designed to minimize
trade in counterfeit goods.8 A counterfeit good is defined in article one of the Code as "any good with a false representation of a
trademark that is entitled to protection under the laws of the
country of importation and which is legally registered where re8. Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit
Goods, preamble, cls. 5, 6 [hereinafter cited as Code]. Although the definition of

"counterfeit goods" in § 1.2.1 of the Code is skeletal at best, many agree with its
definition: counterfeiting is infringment upon a manufacturer's trademark. Pfaff,
Imitators Hot for Things 'haute,' ADVERTISING AGE, May 15, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (5th ed. 1979) (Counterfeiting is defined

as "[t]o forge; to copy or imitate, without authority or right, and with a view to
deceive or defraud. .. .") with Yarnell, Recording Piracy is Everybody's Burden: An Examination of its Causes, Effects and Remedies, 20 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 234 (1973) (Piracy is defined as "[tihe unauthorized duplication for commercial purposes of sound recordings which are then sold in pirate packaging."),
cited in Note, Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings: Transnational
Problem in Search of a Solution, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 399, 400 (1981).

Occasionally, "piracy" is defined to include the abuse of another's trademark
rights, which would make counterfeiting a form of "piracy." See Kaikati &

LaGarce, supra note 1, at 54. More commonly, however, "piracy" is a term used
to describe the copying of sound or video recordings. See Note, supra, at 400. It

is thus appropriate that this Note excludes, as does the Code, the problem of
piracy.
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quired in accordance with the laws of that country."9 Thus, the
counterfeiting described in this paper runs the gamut from luxury
items to common fertilizer. Pirated records, 10 pirated films,11 and
counterfeited currency 12 are beyond the scope of this analysis.
This Note also does not discuss counterfeiting problems in video
game' 3 and other high technology industries, or in industries in
which the primary source of protection is copyright law.'
Two other concepts help delimit the term "counterfeit."
"Knockoffs" are items which are slightly different from the original products but are not sold as genuine articles.' 5 Thus, producing knockoffs is neither a crime under current trademark statutes
nor covered by the new Code. Savvy counterfeiters use this nu-

9. Code, supra note 8, § 1.2.1. "Trademark" is further defined to include
certification and collective marks. Id. § 1.2.2.
10. An annual piracy loss in the record and tape industries equivalent to
20% of total sales represents a problem of international significance. Walker,
The Pirating of Brand Goods, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1981, § 4 at 2, col. 1. In
certain areas of Europe and Asia, sales of legitimate tapes are running behind
sales of counterfeit tapes. Fenby, Boom in Brand Name Fakes, READERS DIG.,
Sept. 1981, at 135, 136. For an excellent discussion of international record
piracy, see generally Note, supra note 8. Since publication of that Note, the
problem of record piracy has reached epidemic proportions. Alarmed, industry

groups are organizing to upgrade their attack on record piracy. Horowitz,
MIDEM Call For Artists To Join PiracyStruggle, BILLBOARD, Jan. 23, 1982, at
1, 72. Because copyright laws are the major vehicle through which record pirates
are prosecuted, the record piracy problem is beyond the trademark orientation

of the Code, supra note 8, and thus outside the scope of this Note.
11. See, e.g., The Crackdown on Movie Pirates,Bus. WK., Apr. 7, 1975, at
86.
12. See, e.g., Treasury,Postal Service and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Appropriations Hearings, Part 1, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 338 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Appropriations Hearings]; N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1981, § 1, at 4, col. 4.
13. See, e.g., Kristof, A New Line in Video Games: Battle of the 'Pirates',
Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1981, at A17, col. 3.
14. The reproduction of copyrighted books is an example of counterfeiting
activities which fall within the ambit of copyright and not trademark protections. See, e.g., Parish & Groskopf-Markley, Counterfeit!L.A.'s hot status crime
for the '80's, L.A., Feb. 1979, at 128. The use of a name similar to that previously registered by another is also outside the scope of this Note: A Tel-Aviv
owner of a McDavid's restaurant went so far as to translate a McDonald's
worker's manual into Hebrew for his employees. Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note
1, at 54. The field of computer programming is rife with opportunities for unscrupulous technicians. See NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50, 55.
15. Parish & Groskopf-Markley, supra note 14, at 131.
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ance to circumvent customs inspections. After all, infringement
does not occur when shipments of Cimega (Omega),"6 Aseikon
(Seiko), 17 Hormilton (Hamilton), 8 Longune (Longines), 19 and
Bulovia (Bulova)2 ° watches cross national borders. The enterprising retailer simply removes or changes the "unnecessary" letter(s)
to create a true counterfeit. Foreign purchasers who cannot tell
the difference between a "loom" and a "moon" proudly sport
lmockoff "Fruit of the Moon," "Fruit of the Gum," and "Fruit on
the Tee-Shirts" tee shirts. 21 A second and related term is "imitation. '22 In merchandising lexicon, an imitation is a copy of an
original which is not sufficiently similar to constitute a counterfeit.23 A "bubbling entrepreneur" in Mexico sold local bubbly
under the same name and label used to identify a premier French
champagne, but added enough Spanish words so that he was only
imitating the product, not counterfeiting. 2 Although imitation is
not a crime, 25 these examples illustrate that the distinction between imitation and counterfeit goods is more form than substance. Thus, a significant element in determining the efficacy of
the proposed Code is its ability to minimize the problems caused
by knockoff and imitation products.

16.
1980;
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Zapalski, La Contrefacon:une activit en expansion, Le Figaro, Avril 22,
see also Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 54.
Fenby, supra note 10, at 137.
Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 54.
Id.
Id.
Hansen, The Capital of Counterfeiting,DUNs REV., Oct. 1978, at 68.
22. Pfaff, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. The manufacturer of Power-Bilt golf clubs, Hillerich & Bradsby Com-

pany, has accused a Taiwanese operation of producing "Power Bolt" golf clubs

on which "Power Bolt" is printed boldly in script identical to the script Hillerich uses to identify its Power-Bilt clubs. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 7,
1981, at 57. French perfumes are another popular target for imitation. See Pfaff,

supra note 8, at 24, col. 1.
25. Pfaff, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1. The Union of Manufacturers for the International Protection of Industrial and Artistic Standards has suggested that
France, Switzerland, and Sweden are the only European nations offering manu-

facturers adequate protection from imitations. Id. at 24.
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II.

THE PROBLEM: COMMERCIAL COUNTERFEITING

A. An Historical Perspective on Commercial Counterfeiting
A brief examination of commercial counterfeiting history demonstrates the need for a new approach to deal with the counterfeiting problem. Because counterfeiting is defined as infringement
upon the trademark of another,28 trademark legislation is intimately connected with the age-old 27 problem of counterfeiting.
Ancient cattle brands were the first trademarks. 2 Compulsory
guildmarks evolved during the Middle Ages. 29 Large scale enact-

ment of trademark legislation did not occur until the mid-1800sY'
Nonetheless, the problems continued. Extensive counterfeiting of
French pharmaceuticals in the 1870s precipitated an 1872 congress in Vienna.3

1

The 1881 Madrid Convention and the 1883

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention) were evidence of the need for unified action. Nevertheless, consumers were purchasing fake Kodak film as early as
190032 and "[t]he prewar Latvians managed to bottle something
called 'natural imitation Eau de Vichy.' ,,s3
B. Commercial Counterfeiting: The Problem Today
The two most outstanding characteristics of counterfeiting today are the overwhelming financial significance and international
26. Code, supra note 8, § 1.2.1.
27. Lewis, A Show of Fraud, Int'l Herald Tribune, Apr. 13, 1979. The Musee
de la Contrefacon contains a fascinating collection of ancient counterfeits, including an original Roman wine displayed next to a wine bottled by "illiterate
Gauls." Id.
28. Patel, Trademarks and the Third World, 7 WORLD DEV.653, 653 (1979).

29. Two types of marks used by manufacturers during the Middle Ages are
predecessors of current trademarks: Merchants' (proprietary) marks and production (guild) marks. Id. at 654. The compulsory use of marks to assist consumers in tracing the origin of a product did not begin until the advent of cutlery marks during the eighteenth century. Id. Penalties for failure to comply
with these guildmarks were severe. In Flanders, a fabric maker could loose a
hand for failure to affix the requisite mark to his tapestries. Kaikati & LaGarce,
supra note 1, at 53.
30. Most notable among this legislation are the early laws enacted by France
(1857), the United Kingdom (1862), and the United States (1870). Patel, supra
note 28, at 654.
31. Lewis, supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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scope314 of the problem. Estimates are plentiful: counterfeiting is
"a multimillion pound business"; 35 losses to legitimate producers
exceed one hundred million dollars annually 3 (considered a conservative estimate by some); 37 there exists a multibillion dollar
worldwide counterfeit fashion problem.3 1 Puritan fashions (makers of Calvin Klein jeans) lost an estimated fifteen to twenty million dollars in wholesale revenues due to counterfeits.3 9 The makers of Levis jeans and Cartier watches both estimate recent losses
at fifteen million dollars per year. 40 British motor part manufacturers lost an estimated 100 million pounds in trade to sellers of
counterfeit parts.41 The Swiss watch industry lost 253 million
pounds in potential sales to the venders of ten million counterfeit
watches. 2 French firms estimate their losses at 180 million
pounds per year, a figure which does not include the value of the
20,000 jobs lost because of counterfeit goods.4 3
These shocking losses plague manufacturers worldwide. The
French luxury goods industry has suffered especially serious damage. 4 Unfortunately, counterfeiting is no longer limited to tradi34. Walker, A Program to Combat Commercial Counterfeiting, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 117, 118 (1980).
35.
36.

Fenby, supra note 10, at 135.
Locking Out the Product Poachers,INT'L

MGMT.,

June 1979, at 14 [here-

inafter cited as Product Poachers].
37.

Walker, supra note 34.

38. Kalbacher, Counterfeiters, THE PLAYBOY GUIDE TO FASHION FOR MEN,
Fall 1980, at 38, 40.
39. Nagy, Those Prestige Goods: Have You Been Had?, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Sept. 7, 1981, at 57.
40. Parish & Groskopf-Markley, supra note 14, at 128.
41. Fenby, supra note 10, at 137.
42. Id. at 137-38.
43. Id. at 137.
44. For example, at least 40,000 counterfeit Tank watches exist-but internationally renowned watchmaker Cartier says that only 50,000 of the original
were produced. Zapalski, supra note 15. Cartier expects that its losses from
counterfeiting will triple this year. Escroqueries:Montres: mefiez-vous des contrafacons, Le Quotidien de Paris, Juillet 18, 1980. After watching helplessly as
counterfeiters cut into Cartier's profits by establishing "Cartier" stores in Mexico City, Cartier opened a "real" Cartier store in Mexico City in 1980 and began
to compete with the counterfeiters for customers. Fenby, supra note 10, at 137.
In any price war, however, the counterfeiters have a keen advantage. An original
Cartier watch can cost as much as 8,000 francs; its counterfeit counterpart may
sell for a mere 500 francs. Zapalski, supra note 16. Stymied investigators discovered that "every second boutique" in Milan, Rome, and Florence sells imitations
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tional luxury goods.45 Designer denims are now haute couture,
and, predictably, counterfeits comprise ten percent of the market.4 Levis jeans are a prime target for counterfeiters.4 7 Tom
Tusher, executive vice president of Levi Strauss & Co.'s Interna-

tional Division, stated, "We believe more counterfeit 'Levis,' or
Levis illegally diverted to the market are sold in Italy than we sell
through our affiliate located in Milan. ' 48 Not content to exploit
the industry on one level, counterfeiters now sell kits to help
other counterfeiters counterfeit Levis 49 Once again, the list is
endless: counterfeit Playboy ties in Canada;5" Apple Computers in
the Far East;51 British Milford door locks in Africa;52 and even
the lowly Vicks inhaler. 53 Incredibly, the familiar red can of Coca'54
Cola may not contain "the real thing.

of chic Louis Vuitton suitcases and bags. Pfaff, supra note 8, at 24. French perfume is another popular target for counterfeiters. The problem is so extensive
that La F~d6ration Frangaise de Parfumerie has established a museum to display confiscated counterfeit perfumes. Id. The list of counterfeited French luxury products is simply endless. The following is only a partial list of products
that are counterfeited incessantly: Moet & Chandon Champagne; Louis Vuitton
cloth and bags; Nini Ricci, Chanel, and Givenchy perfumes; Hennesy Brandy,
French Pernod, Dubonnet, Bordeaux, and Bourgogne wines (all "made" in Mexico). Id. at 1, col. 1. For a general discussion of how foreign trademarks harm
developing countries, see Soberanis, The Need to Establish a Policy Restricting
the Use of ForeignTrademarks in Developing Countries: The Case of Mexico, 7
WORLD D.V. 713 (1979).
45. Walker, supra note 34, at 117.
46. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 38.
47. Counterfeit Levis are produced in Israel and Paraguay, nations not commonly known as major centers of counterfeiting activities. See Lewis, supra note
27.
48. Endicott, Latest InternationalIntrigue: Dealers in Denim, ADVERTISING
AGE, Sept. 12, 1977, at 10, col. 10.
49. Product Poachers, supra note 36, at 14; Salmans, The Piratingof Brand
Goods, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1981, at D2, col. 1. The beleaguered best seller can
take comfort in the knowledge that in some parts of the world Levis are the best
selling jeans-fake Levis run a close second. 'IME, July 14, 1980, at 15.
50. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 41.
51. Asian Orchards, TmE, May 24, 1982, at 68. In the Far East, "knockoff"
Apple Computers sell for $325.00 while the genuine item sells for $1,530.00. And

many "Apolo" computers are sold to potential "Apple" purchasers. Id.
52. Fenby, supra note 10, at 136.
53. Carroll, Manufacturers Waging War on Counterfeits, San Francisco Examiner, May 15, 1981, at Cl.
54. A Crackdown on Fake Brand Name Products, Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 1978,
at 53. Most Coca-Cola infringement actions involve a restaurant offering "Coke"
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Although counterfeiting occurs in every country, certain countries are counterfeiting havens. Current estimates indicate that
Taiwan produces sixty percent of all counterfeit products," and
Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, Korea, Italy, Thailand,
India, and Japan 56 are also well known counterfeiting centers.
C.

More Harm Than Simple Financial Loss

The counterfeiting explosion has created two levels of harm:
harm to the legitimate producer and harm to society. As discussed, shocking revenue losses occur when counterfeit products
are passed off to the consumer.57 Lost revenues, however, are only
the tip of the iceberg; a valuable property right is also lost.
Trademarks protect and increase a corporation's goodwill,5 8 which
is a measure of a corporation's long-term advertising59 and marketing investments.6 Consumer confidence, predictably, "wanes
but actually serving another cola beverage. Basset, Trademark Attorneys Get
Tough, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1981, at 1, 9.
55. Fenby, supra note 10, at 135; see also Spaeth, Hong Kong Counterfeits
Arouse Genuine Ire, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 33, col. 1. For a discussion of
Taiwanese legislation in this area, see infra notes 117-38 and accompanying text.
56. See generally Salmans, supra note 49 at D2, col. 1. Each nation, of
course, has its specialities. Hong Kong counterfeiters are known for their counterfeit luxury goods. See Spaeth, supra note 55, at 33, col. 1. Hong Kong, however, has been replaced by Italy as the leading counterfeiting center for certain
products. Shiro, Keeping Jeans Honest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1981, at 21, col. 2

(statements of Mike Fehr, Assistant Director of Corporate Security, Levi
Strauss).
57. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., 87 C.J.S. Trademarks § 3 (1954). The goodwill function is evidenced by the sheer extent of trademark registration. Nearly four million trademarks are in force throughout the world. Patel, Editor's Introduction,7 WORLD
Drv. 649, 650 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Patel, Introduction]. An estimated
100,000 trademarks receive new protection each year. Id. Seventy percent of
these marks are in developed countries, three percent are in socialist countries,
and 27% are in developing countries. Patel, supra note 28, at 653. Over one-half
of the trademarks registered in these developing countries are owned by foreigners. Id. The extent of this system of protection is impressive; in 1977 trademark
legislation was in force in 119 countries, 83 of which were developing countries.
Wassermann, UNCTAD: Trademarks and Developing Countries, 14 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 80, 81 (1980).
59. See Patel, Introduction, supra note 58, at 649.
60. Many products have received trademark protection over a long period of
time: Baker's Chocolate (prior to 1800); Colgate (1806); Gordon's Gin (1769);
Ivory Soap (1879); Quaker Oats (1895); Bicycle Playing Cards (1885); Vaseline
Petroleum Jelly (1878); Kodak (1888); Waterman (1884); Singer (1851); Camp-

Fall 1982_1

ANTICOUNTERFEITING CODE

as the aped product literally comes apart at the seams."'" Nowhere is the significance of goodwill more clearly illustrated than
in corporate expenditures for the protection of trademarks. Hundreds of thousands of dollars are spent annually to protect the
trademarks "Coca-Cola" and "Coke"; it is no surprise that the
Coca-Cola Company valued these trademarks as intangible assets
62
worth three billion dollars.
Although producers may assume the risk of counterfeiting as
part of an initial marketing decision, society should bear no similar risk. Counterfeiting harms society in several ways. First, it
may have disastrous economic consequences. Ineffective counterfeit pesticides are estimated to have caused approximately ten
percent of the fifteen percent decrease in Kenya's largest foreign
export crop.6 3 The problem perpetuated itself when Kenyan farmers, afraid that the ineffective counterfeit pesticides were particularly dangerous, became reluctant to use any pesticides. 64 The
[Kenyan] Weekly Review summed up the situation:
It may be planned economic sabotage, or just an international ring
of greedy and unscrupulous businessmen trying to make a fast
buck. Whichever the case, the end result is the same-the economies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, that depend to a large extent on coffee as their main cash crop, are threatened with ruin by
the proliferation of ineffective substandard agro-chemicals that
have been dumped in those countries [and several other countries
in the eastern Africa region] from European sources, in the past
three years or so. 5

bell & Kelloggs (1915); Coca-Cola (1886). Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 TRADE-MARK
75, 76 (1974).

REP.

61. Endicott, supra note 48, at 10, col. 1; cf. Allen, Designer Jeans Fakers
Pocket Profits, Pittsburgh Press, Jan. 17, 1982, at B1. Mr. Allen claims that
counterfeit jeans often sell at designer prices. Allen, supra, at B1. Indeed, a luxury bag maker is rumored to be worried because the counterfeits of its products
sold in Europe are better than the original product. Spaeth, supra note 55, at 33.
62. Lunsford, supra note 60, at 81. The importance of trademark protection
is heightened because trademarks are the only aspect of nonprice competition
that receives specific legal protection. Patel, Introduction,supra note 58, at 649.
63. These estimates were made by the Kenyan Coffee Board based upon the
1979-1980 season. East African Economies Threatened with Ruin, [KENYAN]
WEEKLY REv., Feb. 20, 1981, at 21, 22 (hereinafter cited as East African
Economies).
64. Id. at 22.
65. Id. at 21.
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Second, the presence of a counterfeiting industry endangers sociological development. In Taiwan, lynchpin for the East Asian
counterfeiting market,"6 some argue that "counterfeiting retards
innovation. '8 7 Other well-documented problems present disastrous scenarios that have, and will, occur. A Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report cautioned that there is a "clear and present
danger of a disasterous [plane] crash caused by bogus bolts." '
Evidence from the industry mounted. In 1981 Jonathan Fenby reported that counterfeit helicopter parts may have caused or contributed to two crashes.6 9 Medical technology is another area in
which counterfeit products pose unconscionable dangers. Counterfeit pacemakers are widely used and may have contributed to

some deaths; it is difficult to cull information on this subject because doctors fear liability for failing to recognize counterfeit

products.70 Counterfeit prescription drugs also worry industry
and government officials; over-regulation is not a major concern
of counterfeiters.7 1 Finally, counterfeiting deceives consumers.
Rational consumer choice is premised on the ability to acquire
product information: trademarks are a prime source of that information.7 2 The visual component of a trademark evokes identifica-

66. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
67. Tanzer, Out for the Counterfeit,FAR E. ECON. REV., July 10, 1981, at 46.
68. Spaeth, supra note 55, col. 1. In the autumn of 1979 the Los Angeles
regional office of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a report on counterfeit bolts used in many planes. This source did not suggest that the counterfeit bolts had caused any crashes, but a Freedom of Information Act request by
the Wall Street Journal yielded interesting information. Harris, Report of Bogus
or Altered Aircraft Bolts Leads to FAA Alert and Coding Proposal,Wall St. J.,
July 7, 1980, at 2, col. 3. "[T]he greater likelihood of harm comes from the possibility that bogus fasteners will accumulate in the same system over time and
then jointly lead to a serious crash resulting in fatalities." Id.
69. Fenby, supra note 10, at 137.
70. Hansen, supra note 21, at 74.

71. Cf. Lewis, supra note 27.
72.

Mangini, Competition and Monopoly in Trademark Law, 11 INT'L REV.
591, 592 (1980). This argument, however, presupposes a certain initial level of consumer knowledge. The argument that trademarks help the consumer identify quality merchandise is premised on the existence of an expert buyer (1) able to appreciate quality; (2) aware of all his
purchase alternatives; and (3) able to calculate the marginal gains and losses
resulting from his choices to yield the highest possible benefit. Green, Benefits
and Costs of Trademarks:Lessons for the Developing Countries,7 WORLD DEV.
683, 684 (1979). These considerations have led some scholars to question the role
trademarks play in helping consumers identify quality items. Wassermann,
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
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tion among those who cannot, or do not, read the more detailed
label information.7 3 Counterfeiters act on the knowledge that consumers rely on these trademarks. As Mr. Bikoff of Cartier, Inc.,
lamented, counterfeiters are "counterfeiting products we don't
even make" such as. chocolates, calculators, and a Singapore
house of ill repute. 4 Clearly, counterfeiting is a problem of
financial significance, international scope, and devastating
consequences.
D.

Causes of the Counterfeiting Explosion

Identifying the causes of the counterfeiting explosion is a crucial step in evaluating the Code. Many suggest that product

shortages create a fertile environment for counterfeiting. 5 This
demand analysis crumbles in the face of the counterfeiters' ingesupra note 58, at 84. Indeed, a Canadian government study concluded:
This [quality information] function has not been served as well as it might
....
IT]he predominant emphasis in the law has been related to the producers or sellers interests, which only indirectly serve the business interests... [T]he trademark itself is only a very abbreviated way of expressing the full set of qualities of a product or service ....
Patel, supra note 28, at 655, (citing ECONOMIC COUNCIL

OF CANADA, REPORT ON

(1977)).
73. This identification function has special significance:

INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 143

The late Henry C. Link stressed that there is more active competitive democracy in our trademark system than in our political democracy because
people vote for or against trademarked articles not once a year, but every
day ....
This noted authority summarized his reasoning in the following
language: "More people elect Campbell Soup every four weeks than elect
the president every four years; more people vote for Maxwell House Coffee
and Colgate Dental Cream, etc., every few weeks than vote for Congress

every two years. And as for the international scene, people throughout the
world have more faith in Coca-Cola and Camel Cigarettes than they do in
national treaties or the United States foreign policy. Coca-Cola, for example, is a typical product of the free enterprise system which makes a brotherhood of man possible. Its use represents an act of faith in which all men,
regardless of nationality, are friends."
Lunsford, supra note 60, at 90-91. (quoting Link, The Social Significance of
Trade-Marks, 38 TRADE-MARK REP. 622, 625 (1948) (footnote omitted)).

74. Basset, supra note 54, at 1, 9. Joining in the refrain, a Playboy executive

emphasized that Playboy does not license the right to use its rabbit on jeans.
"Playboy" rabbit jeans are counterfeits. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 41.
75. See, e.g., Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 52; Kalbacher, supra note
38, at 38; East African Economies, supra note 63, at 19 (agro-chemicals); Keep-

ing Jeans Honest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1981, at 21, col. 2 (blue jeans) [hereinafter cited as Jeans].
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nuity and greed. In 1977 a spokesperson for Levi Strauss & Company indicated that the company could have doubled its jeans
sales." Company officials indicated that their actions to fill world
demand for Levis would decrease the market for counterfeit
jeans.7 7 Today, however, sales of fake Levis in some nations outstrip sales of the real product by a factor of two to one.7 Demand
analysis also fails to account for spot shortages. In Eastern Europe shortages forced the price of jeans as high as $80 per pair.79
A denim glut in other markets will not equalize the supply; the
low price tag on the counterfeit good allows it to absorb the existing market for designer merchandise and to attract an entirely
new clientele unable to afford the price of designer jeans.
Social and legal attitudes also encourage counterfeiting.8 0 As
the fashion capitals of the world frantically define, refine, and de-

sign current haute couture, social pressure to wear the latest labels mounts. Ineffective local laws8 1 impede legal redress and coddle counterfeiters in an environment conducive to their criminal
activity. The odds that a counterfeiter will not be penalized are
increased because imitating products is not illegal.8 2 Furthermore,
the success of any counterfeiting investigation depends on local
8
police cooperation8 3 and payoffs are not uncommon. '
The world economic structure further perpetuates the counterfeiting problem. One significant element in this process is "the
greater industrial capability of developing nations with supplies
of cheap and abundant labour."8' 5 In addition, "highly fragmented"8 6 markets lacking the presence of major chain stores facilitate the distribution of counterfeit products.

76. Endicott, supra note 48 at 10, col. 1.
77. Id. at 95.
78. Id.
79.

Id.

80. Mr. Godart-Bagy of the Comite Colbert explained, "[T]oday everyone
wants to be part of the elite." Pfaff, supra note 7, at 1, col. 1. The problem has
taken an interesting twist: "[I]n certain chic circles in Italy, it's much more fashionable to wear the fake." Hansen, supra note 21, at 68.
81. See infra notes 129-54.

82. See Pfaff, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1.
83. Id. at 24.
84. This corruption has many outward manifestations. For example, investigators are amazed that many counterfeiters are protected by a reliable pre-bust

warning system. See generally Zapalski, supra note 16.
85. Product Poachers, supra note 36, at 14.
86. Endicott, supra note 48, at 10, col. 1.
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The inherent nature of these economic and social counterfeiting
"causes" ensures that the problem will continue. William Walker
highlights five considerations indicating that counterfeiting will
increase absent more effective responses: (1) counterfeiting is lucrative; (2) compared with other illegal enterprises, counterfeiting
is a relatively low risk operation; (3) large corporations are losing
their ability to protect their trademarks because international respect for the concept and practice of trademark registration is decreasing; (4) developing countries may eventually sanction counterfeiting because it provides much needed cash flow; and (5)
87
brand names have increasing international appeal.

Counterfeiting has become a profession. Many suggest that organized crime's is involved.89 A New York detective familiar with
garment counterfeiting explained the organized crime link:
"Denim in quantity is gonna [sic] cost and counterfeiters aren't
gonna [sic] get loans at the bank."'90 Start up costs are nonexistent: factories that produce legitimate goods during the day are
87. Walker, supra note 34, at 117-18.
88. The author is sensitive to the negative connotations evoked by use of
generalized terms like "organized crime." A 1951 United States report indicated
the existence of a nationwide crime syndicate. SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3D INTERIM REPORT, S.

REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1951). This report, however, must be
reevaluated in light of a 1977 report admitting that no commonly agreed upon
definition of "organized crime" exists. UNITED STATES GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, WAR ON ORGANIZED CRIME FALTERING (1977). Evidence exists, however,
that certain criminal activity is characterized by a high level of sophistication
and planning. Unfortunately, both in the United States and abroad this professional criminal activity is labeled far too loosely. See, e.g., Schwidrowski, Italy's
Mafia Blight, 27 WORLD PREss REV. 56 (1980) (comparing international operations of the "Mafia" to those of a multinational corporation and discussing the

Italian "Mafia"). What separates counterfeiting from many other types of crime
is that either the process by which the product is counterfeited or the manner in
which the counterfeit product is distributed requires the resources of a more
sophisticated criminal enterprise. Accord A. BLOCK & W. CHAMBLIS, ORGANIZING
CRIME 118 (1981) (citing McIntosh, New Directions in the Study of Criminal
Organization,in DEVIANCE AND CONTROL IN EUROPE: PAPERS FROM THE EUROPEAN
GROUP FOR THE STUDY OF DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

(1975)).

89. See, e.g., Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 38 (French and Italian counterfeiting arrest records point to organized crime involvement in counterfeiting); Parish & Groshopf-Markley, supra note 14, at 134 (Cartier attorney Bikoff says organized crime is involved); Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 1978, at 53-54 (International
Anticounterfeiting Coalition attorney William Walker indicates his suspicion
that organized crime is involved).
90. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 38.
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often nighttime netherworlds of counterfeit production.9 1
III.
A.

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CONFRONT THE PROBLEM

Symbiotic Interaction Between the Public and Private
Sectors

Private sector, governmental, and intergovernmental entities

are responding to the commercial counterfeiting problem. These
sectors act symbiotically. The private sector seeks governmental
reforms while governmental efforts depend upon private sector
cooperation and private sector development of new anticounterfeiting technology. The Code is a joint effort by these
sectors to confront a problem of public and private international
legal significance. This dual legitimization of Code goals enhances
the international norm-creating properties of the Code.
B.

Private Corporate Action in Response to the Counterfeiting
Problem

The counterfeiting problem has engendered a flurry of concerted activity in private industry. Industry vigilance is most dramatically displayed in the formation of anticounterfeiting groups.
The most vocal and well-publicized of these groups is the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (Coalition).92 Under the direction of attorney William Walker, the Coalition has lobbied for
new United States customs laws13 and for the initial draft version
of the proposed Code.9 4 Future Coalition plans demonstrate simi91. Allen, supra note 61, at B-1.
92. Peter T. Jones, Levi Strauss Senior Vice-President and General Counsel,
is president of the Coalition. Sacramento Bee, May 15, 1981, at B4, col. 1. Coali-

tion members include such corporate giants as Levi Strauss & Company, Walt
Disney Productions, The V.F. Corporation (Lee Jeans), Cartier of France, see
Basset, supra note 54, at 8, Puma (West German shoe manufacturers), the Distillers Company Limited (Johnny Walker Scotch), see Salmons, supra note 49,
at D2, col. 1, Samsonite Corporation, Helene Curtis Limited, Munsinger, Incorporated, see Kaikati & LeGarce, supra note 1, at 54, General Mills Incorporated,
General Electric Company, Cross Pens, Moet-Hennessey, see Parish & Groskopf-Markley, supra note 14, at 128, Charles of the Ritz Group, Limited, Caterpillar Tractor Company, see Basset, supra note 54, at 8, Avon Products, British
Bank Wole Company, and Genetech and Monsanto Company. See Sacramento
Bee, May 15, 1981, at B4, col. 1.
93.

Product Poachers, supra note 36, at 16.

94. For a general discussion of the Coalition's lobbying efforts, see Walker,
supra note 34, at 21; N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1981, § IV, at 2, col. 1. According to
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lar ambition: (1) monitoring implementation efforts under the
proposed Code; (2) cultivating close relationships with the international surveillance group established under the proposed Code;
(3) expanding Coalition membership and activities to cover other
types of intellectual property; 5 (4) confronting the problem of
counterfeiting in developing countries;98 (5) encouraging diplomatic action to combat counterfeiting;97 (6) developing an information exchange;9" and (7) popularizing criminal sanctions as appropriate penalties for counterfeiters. 9
Other cooperative organizations complement Coalition activities. 100 In Paris, the Union des Fabricates (Union) guards the
trademarks of its 1200 member corporations.101 Representatives
from two hundred luxury goods firms from twenty countries met
in 1980. This group now has a computer record of 500,000 internationally known counterfeiters. 10

2

Great Britain also has an an-

group. 0 3

ticounterfeiting
Coalitions and organizations are merely one manifestation of
corporate concern about counterfeiting. Individual corporations
are engaged in a wide variety of activities designed to eradicate
the common enemy. Until recently, corporations took a "hands
off" approach to the counterfeiting problem because of the often
ruinous publicity, prohibitive costs, and futile lawsuits in-

Coalition President Peter T. Jones, the Coalition's "two highest ... objectives
are to get Canada and Japan to sign the international counterfeiting code."
Carroll, supra note 53, at C1.
95. Walker, supra note 34, at 128-30.
96. The Code was designed to garner the signatures of developed nations as
opposed to the support of developing nations. Id. at 131.
97. Walker, supra note 34, at 131.
98. Id. at 132.
...

99. Id.
100. Although outside the scope of this Note, the Amusement Device Manufacturers Association is another organization which has responded to the counterfeiting problem. Kristof, supra note 13, at A17, col. 3.

101. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 40. Additionally, in 1954 the Comite Colbert was established by French companies to protect famous trademarks. Pfaff,
supra note 8, at 1, col. 1. The Union recently hired a former Scotland Yard
detective to assist in its search for counterfeiters. Id.
102. Fenby, supra note 10, at 138. Approximately 1000 new names are added
to the list each year. Id.
103. Id. The group is composed of well-known British manufacturers including Dunlop, Lucas Industries, Parker Pen, the Wellcome Foundation, and Ronson Products. Id.

820

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15.803

volved.10 ' Spurred on by the extent of the counterfeiting problem
and the esprit de corps among affected industries, corporations
have developed strategies to fight back. Many corporations now

prosecute offenders." 5 Prior to suit, however, investigations must
be conducted and suspects identified. Cartier spends over one

million dollars each year investigating and suing counterfeiters. 10 6

Included among its activities is a program for training customs
inspectors to detect counterfeit products. °7 Informal cooperation
has been a boon to identification efforts. For example, Blue Bell,
Incorporated's security force aided Levi Strauss & Company in a

recent European anticounterfeiting investigation.108 Much of the
information about counterfeiting, however, is acquired by chance.
Pfizer Incorporated, a United States drug and chemical company,

discovered a counterfeiting problem when it received orders for
450-litre tubs of a product that it sold only in 225-litre

containers.10 9
The most frustrating aspect of investigating counterfeiting is
the futility of prosecution. Despite recent notable successes,'

na-

104. Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 58. The rationale for this laissez
faire policy was that counterfeiting could be deterred by not publicizing the
counterfeiter's activities. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 38.
105. Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 58.
106. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 7, 1981, at 57. Similar sums are expended by Gucci Shops, Incorporated, Levi Strauss & Company, and by the
makers of Spaulding Sporting Goods. Id. Indeed, most French luxury goods
firms have special divisions to deal with this problem. Pfaff, supra note 8, at 24.
Jordache spends $500,000 per year investigating counterfeiting and employs private detectives and a full-time investigator. Jeans, supra note 75, at 21, col. 2.
Levi Strauss & Company established an internal security force in 1970 which
eventually shifted its focus from general theft to product imitation problems.
Endicott, supra note 48, at 95. Monies are expended in a variety of ways to halt
counterfeiting. Levi's Director of Corporate Security explained that Levi's battle
against counterfeiters includes conferring with suppliers, conferring with other
companies, and paying for information about counterfeiters. Ring of Counterfeiters, supra note 2, at 27. Playboy Enterprise officials claim that Playboy does
not have to employ as many investigators as do other manufacturers because
Playboy magazine readers provide voluminous tips regarding the potential copying of Playboy products. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 40.

107. Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 40.
108. Endicott, supra note 48, at 95. Extensive inter-corporation cooperation
designed to combat counterfeiting has occured. Product Poachers, supra note
36, at 14.
109. Product Poachers, supra note 36, at 14-15.
110. Levi Strauss & Company, for example, recently squashed "the most so-
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tional laws, attitudes, and finances have doomed most prosecution attempts from their inception."' United States law exemplifies this problem: on the federal level, no law specifically
criminalizes counterfeiting. 112 The hapless corporate plaintiff
must structure its case to prove either mail fraud or violation of
other federal statutes. Otherwise, it must rely on unsatisfactory
state"i s unfair competition laws. Although new United States customs laws'114 give customs authorities who have seized goods" 5 the

option to destroy, reexport, or donate the goods to charity, customs officials usually decide to reexport the goods. 116 Counterfeitphisticated counterfeiting operation" with which it has dealt. Fenby, supra note
10, at 140. In Antwerp, DuPont de Nemours is suing Reinstra, an alleged participant in the African agro-chemical scandal, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text, and four of his corporations for infringement of DuPont's Belgian
patents. The Dutch-Israeli Connection, [KENYAN] WEEKLY REV., Feb. 20, 1981,
at 19, 23-24.
111. Manufacturers generally sue offenders under the trademark or unfair
competition law of the jurisdiction in which the offender is located. The relief
granted is often unsatisfactory because large penalties are seldom imposed and
criminal prosecutions are rare. Walker, supra note 34, at 119-20.
112. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 7, 1981, at 57.
113. But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A CriticalHistory of Legal Thought, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 305, 339 (1979).
Goldstein and Kewanee overruled Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
Sears and Compco stood for the proposition that state unfair competition laws
were preempted by federal copyright and patent laws. Goldstein and Kewanee,
however, have been interpreted "as breathing new life into state unfair competition laws." McClure, supra, at 339. State laws generally treat counterfeiting as a
misdemeanor. U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Sept. 7, 1981, at 57.
114. The effectiveness of the law is largely dependent on the United States
Customs Service, which is "responsible for the investigation of acts in violation
of the Customs and related laws." Appropriations Hearings, supra note 12, at
266.

115. Although confiscation is mandated under the new customs law, the confiscation can occur only after the companies have reported violations. Salmans,
supra note 49, at D2, col. 1.
116. Under the new customs law, an importer is given an opportunity to
prove that the seized goods are not counterfeit. If the trademark owner continues to pursue his complaint, he has the right to post bond and to redouble his
efforts to prove that the goods are counterfeit. Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 1978, at 54.
Goods ultimately proven to be counterfeit can be kept by the Government, given
to a charitable institution, or auctioned off after one year. Id. The major problem with the former United States law is that it allowed the counterfeiter to
retrieve the goods after removal of the bogus trademark. Current law in many
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ers thus get another chance to perpetrate their fraud.
The likelihood of success in prosecuting counterfeiters declines
drastically in other countries.1 17 The Taiwanese system is particularly frustrating because of the extent of counterfeiting on the island 18 and the weakness of Taiwanese laws.11 9 For example, the
"owner of a foreign trademark, not registered or in use, has no
standing to sue for infringement [in Taiwan]. '2 0 Prison sentences
are easily converted to minimal fines. 2 1 Furthermore, recent
Taiwanese court decisions show that Taiwanese courts will focus

on the Taiwanese consumer,1 22 not the foreign trademark owner.

other nations permits that same problem. The counterfeiter is thus free to relabel his goods and ship them into another country. Id.; Walker, supra note 33,
at 120. United States customs officials first took advantage of the 1978 law allowing them to destroy counterfeit goods in October of 1981. See TIME, Oct. 26,
1981, at 67.
117. Among the trouble spots in Europe, France alone is reputed to have
workable laws for prosecuting counterfeiters. Pfaff, supra note 8, at 24.
118. The Taiwanese counterfeiting connection is extraordinary. The Director
of the Taiwanese National Bureau of Standards, C.O. Kuo, says that his office
reviews approximately 20 counterfeiting complaints each day. One-third of these
complaints are from foreign manufacturers. Upon investigation, 80% of those
complaints proved to be legitimate. Kuo "admitted that Taiwan is one of the
leading violators of trademarks." Tanzer, supra note 67, at 46.
119. Taiwanese laws for prosecuting counterfeiters are so lax that some European businessmen want to retaliate by boycotting Taiwanese goods. Id. There
are indications, however, that concerted pressure on Taiwanese officials will
prove fruitful. A joint complaint from several United States, United Kingdom,
and French cosmetics manufacturers spurred the Taiwanese government to raid
52 firms suspected of counterfeiting and to prosecute the firms' officers for criminal fraud. Product Poachers, supra note 36, at 16.
120. Hoffman & Brownstone, Protection of Rights Acquired by International Reputation without Use or Registration, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 1, 37
(1981).
121. Cf. Fenby, supra note 10, at 140 (prison sentences can be commuted to
£15 fines); Tanzer, supra note 67, at 46 (Taiwanese trademark lawyer emphasizes that sentences of six months or less may be converted to fines); King, Car
Parts Counterfeiting: West Hopes for Taiwan Curb, FIN. TIMEs, June 15, 1981
(prison sentences can be commuted to £40 fines); San Francisco Examiner, May
15, 1981, at Cl (low penalties converted to fines).
122. Hoffman & Brownstone, supra note 120, at 32 (citing Puma Sports Shoe
Mfg. Co. v. Nan Hung Garments Indus., No. 67-Pan-217 (Taiwan Admin. Ct.
Apr. 14, 1978) (unreported) (translated from Chinese)). In Puma, possessors of
the widely registered trademark for "Puma" products began opposition proceedings against a Taiwanese firm which attempted to register that name in Taiwan.
The Taiwanese Administrative Court cited art. 37(6) of the Taiwan Trademark
Law: "A trademark design may not be applied for registration if [it is] likely to
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It is thus not surprising that Taiwanese trademark lawyer C.C.
Yao concludes that a successful counterfeiting prosecution in Taiwan nets only legal fees and a published apology. 12 3 After much

debate, 24 in 1981 the Taiwanese enacted Measures for the Prevention of Imitation of Trademarks and False Indication of Place
of Origin. 125 Although this legislation is a step in the right direction, it will have little suasive power because it does not provide
penalties for counterfeiting. The Taiwanese Judicial Yuan is
working on a new law which would provide stiff mandatory prison
sentences for counterfeiters, but Far East analysts estimate that
passage of this bill is at least two years away.1 26 Other Far Eastern nations present a similarly discouraging scenario. In Japan
counterfeiters can be prosecuted under the Trademark Law and
the Unfair Competition Prevention Law. 127 Damages, however,
are difficult to collect.1 28 In the Phillipines there is no clear penalty for manufacturing or producing counterfeit products. 29 Singapore, despite persistent reports of intensified counterfeiting ac-

tivities within its borders,130 may not recognize the significance of
the problem. 31 Italy, the main site of European counterfeiting acdisturb public order or corrupt good morals or to deceive the public or cause the
public to have a misbelief." Id.
123. Tanzer, supra note 67, at 46.
124.

Original plans called for a task force to announce a new counterfeiting

law on April 25, 1981, but the proposed law did not take effect until August
1981. Id.
125. For a general outline of the new Taiwanese law, see King, supra note
121.
126. Tanzer, supra note 67, at 46.
127. Japan Times, Oct. 21, 1978, at 2. The Trademark Act of 1959 was enacted on April 13, 1959, and became effective on April 1, 1960 (Law No. 127).
Yamada, Japan: Trademark Law & Practice,in 1 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS (rev. ed. 1982).
128. Japan Times, May 13, 1981, at 5.
129. TIME, July 14, 1980, at 15 (explanation by a Manila attorney). Prosecutions in the Philippines are pursued under the Philippine Trademark Law, Republic Act No. 166, which became effective on June 20, 1947. Republic Acts Nos.
638 (June 11, 1951), 681 (May 9, 1952), 865 (June 16, 1953), 623 (June 5, 1951)
are amendments to this law. The Philippine bureau of printing publishes the
Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippines Patent Office in Trademark
Cases for 1962, which serves to supplement the law. Ferrer, Philippines:Trade-

mark Law & Practice,in 1 DIGEST
130.
131.

OF COMMERcIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PAT-

(rev. ed. 1982).
See supra note 59.
In a letter to the author dated June 14, 1982, Laurence Ang, for the

ENTS AND TRADEMARKS
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tivities, offers only limited prospects for the successful prosecution of counterfeiters. 13 2 In the myriad developing nations which
lack trademark statutes, successful prosecution is fortuitous.133
Product withdrawal is another method of combating counterfeiters. Brash Italian counterfeiters forced designer Louis Vuitton
to cease all Italian sales of his coveted handbags. 3 Other corporations have adopted a warning strategy, admonishing offenders
that legal action will result unless their counterfeiting ceases immediately.135 Given the farcical nature of many counterfeiting
prosecutions, such admonishments are taken lightly.
Manufacturers' anticounterfeiting research and development
activities have proven more fruitful than many other corporate
attacks on counterfeiting. Polaroid Corporation's "Polaprof" 36
and Minnesota Manufacture & Mining's "Confirm" tapes are applied to product tags producing "noncounterfeitable" patterns of
colors.13 7 Other producers attempt to educate the consumer about
Attorney General of Singapore, responded to questions regarding counterfeiting
in Singapore. Mr. Ang indicated that he did feel counterfeiting was a serious

problem in Singapore. He indicated that he did not have statistics on the success of counterfeiting prosecutions in Singapore. Under § 69A of the [Singapore]
Trade Marks Act, imprisonment not exceeding two years is the maximum penalty that can be imposed on counterfeiters. Singapore is now in the midst of
drafting new legislation to curb counterfeiting. Letter from Lawrence Ang to
Shari Olenik (June 14, 1982).
132. See generally Product Poachers,supra note 36, at 15. For example, Pfizer, Inc. prosecuted an Italian doctor selling counterfeit "Pfizer" drugs. The doctor, however, received only a 45 day suspended sentence.
133. The absence of trademark legislation does not totally destroy all hope
for a successful prosecution. As a passage from a Dubai (United Arab Emirates)
decision indicates, the success of counterfeiting prosecutions is fortuitous:
The court is of the view that the non-existence of a law regulating the
registration of trademarks in Dubai [United Arab Emirates] does not indicate an absence of protection for the owner of a trademark against the
imitation of such trademark ... or trade in imitated goods ... irrespective of its registration in other countries.
Bigger, Notes from Other Nations, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 169, 170 (1979) (citing
Beecham Group, Ltd. v. Mohammed Ahmed Zamin Pima & Co., 1979 Fleet
Street Rep. 121 (Ct. of Emir of Dubai, June 24, 1978)).
134. Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 58.
135. Id.
136. Sacramento Bee, May 15, 1981, at B4, col. 1.
137. These products are not designed to stop counterfeiters; rather they
merely make it easier for sales representatives to spot counterfeit products. San
Francisco Examiner, May 15, 1982, at C2, col. 1. Other devices designed to safeguard product integrity include inventions which identify people based on their
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the differences between real and counterfeit products-a difference which the legitimate manufacturer is often unable to discern. 138 Although well-intentioned, these efforts are sometimes ridiculous: "Bona fide Izod Lacoste shirts sport well-bred alligator
emblems that are securely sewn around the perimeter. Fake alligators tend to look emaciated and may be glued on or stitched
139
through the center.'

C.

Government Action in Response to the Counterfeiting
Problem

Intergovernmental efforts to minimize counterfeiting and other
trademark violations, once the province of developed nations
alone, are now influenced by the complaints and concerns of the
lesser developed nations. 140 The Paris Convention for the Protec-

tion of Industrial Property 4 1 provides an example of the influence of the lesser developed nations. Representatives at an 1883
Paris meeting agreed to a multilateral treaty which established a
framework for the Paris Union. 142 Approximately eighty nations,
voices, signatures, fingerprints, etc. Product Poachers, supra note 36, at 16.
138. One manufacturer discovered that a counterfeit version of the headlight
it manufactured differed from the original by only one rivet. Fenby, supra note
10, at 137. Levi Strauss & Company discovered counterfeit jeans made of such
high quality material that it almost passed Levi's stringent inspection standards.
Kalbacher, supra note 38, at 41.
139.

Spotting the Fakes, THE PLAYBOY GUIDE

TO FASHION FOR MEN,

Fall

1981, at 40.
140. The author makes no attempt to define "developed" or "lesser developed" nations. She proposes that the reader not be concerned with the validity
of any of the current definitions. For the purposes of this Note, the distinction is
significant only to indicate that national attitudes toward the proposed Code
may vary depending upon the particular nation's level of development.
141. Convention of Paris for the Protection bf Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, reprinted in 2 DIGEST OF THE COMMEMRcIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (rev. ed.
1980) (cumulative changes and additions to Convention of Paris) [hereinafter
cited as Convention]. The Convention was revised at Brussels (1900), Washington (1911), the Hague (1925), London (1934), Lisbon (1958), and Stockholm
(1967). For a list of nations bound by these revisions, see Lucas, Convention of
Paris, in 2 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (rev. ed. 1980) (cumulative changes and additions to Convention of Paris). Another example is the
General Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial Name Protection. Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 60.
142. The Convention is an open multilateral treaty. Cansser, Violations of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 11 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP & COPYRIGHT LAW 1, 1-2 (1980).
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half of which are developed nations, 143 now adhere to the Convention. 144 The Convention covers patents, industrial designs, commercial names, and trademarks. It prohibits the registration and
use of confusing trademarks,145 proscribes unfair competition,146
and provides for the seizure of counterfeit items.1 4 Not surprisingly, the seizure provision 48 was extensively debated in the early
years of the Paris Union,14 and the original text which mandated
the seizure of counterfeit goods was modified with precatory language. Efforts to update the Paris Convention150 have not been
directed specifically at counterfeiting problems. Lesser developed
nations have requested revisions 51 to the Paris Convention which
143.
144.
145.
146.

Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 60.
Id.
Convention, supra note 141, arts. 6, 9, 10.
Id. art. 6.

147. Id. art. 9.
148. The seizure provision in the Paris Convention provides:

1. All goods unlawfully bearing a trademark or trade name shall be
seized on importation into those countries of the Union where such mark
or name has a right to legal protection.

2. Seizure shall likewise be effected in the country where the unlawful
application occured or in the country into which the goods bearing it have

been imported.
3. Seizure shall take place at the request either of the public prosecutor
or of any other competent authority or of any interested party, whether a
natural or a juridicial [sic] person, in conformity with the domestic law of
each country.
4. The authorities shall not be bound to effect seizure in transit.
5. If the law of the country does not permit seizure on importation, such
seizure shall be replaced by prohibition of importation or by seizure within
such country.
6. If the law of a country permits neither seizure on importation nor
seizure with[in] the country, then until such time as the law is modified
accordingly, these measures shall be replaced by the actions and remedies
available in such cases to nationals under the law of such country.
Id. art. 9. Article 9 was revised by Act of the Hague, Nov. 6, 1925, reprintedin 2
DIGEST OF THE COMMERcIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD 7 (rev. ed. 1980) (cumulative

changes and additions to Convention of Paris).
149. See 2 S. LADAs, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS § 692
(1975).
150. The Trademark Registration Treaty of 1973 has been drawn up within
the Paris Convention. It has not yet been ratified. Wassermann, supra note 58,
at 83.
151. In the October 1977 Declaration of Governmental Experts from Developing Countries, the developing nations requested that the Paris Convention be
amended to

Fall 19821

ANTICOUNTERFEITING CODE

are antithetical to Western concepts of trademark protection. The
perception among lesser developed nations that trademark protection perpetuates colonial domination152 presages a negative response to any anticounterfeiting Code promoted by the developed
nations. Thus, it is doubtful that the Paris Convention will evolve
as a significant forum for the battle against counterfeiters.
Other specialized intergovernmental organizations provide assistance in combating counterfeiting. In 1950 the eighty-one
member Customs Cooperation Council was formed to study questions and circulate customs information. 15 3 Article 9 of the Treaty
explicitly recognize member countries' rights for revocation or forfeiture of
trademarks for reason[s] of public interest ... when the owner or licensee
of the mark has speculated or misused price-wise or quality-wise a product
protected by the trademark to the detriment of the public or the national
economy of a member country.
Declaration of Governmental Experts from Developing Countries Members of
the Groups of 77 on the role of the Industrial Property System in the Transfer
of Technology, Oct. 1977, reprinted in 7 WORLD DEV. 751, 752 (1979) (Annex II)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration].
152. This perception is fueled by several historic and economic facts. Foreign
trademarks played a substantial role in the development of the trademark systems in the lesser developed nations during their early periods of industrialization. Chadnovsky, Foreign Trademarks in Developing Countries, 7 WORLD DEV.
663, 666 (1979). Second, products bearing foreign trademarks often carried
higher price tags. See id.; Wassermann, supra note 58, at 84. Third, sales of
products bearing foreign trademarks often prevented sales of products more
suited to the needs of the developing country. Id. Fourth, it is feared that advertisements for products bearing foreign trademarks result in the imposition of
nonindigenous cultural values. Id.; see also Declaration, supra note 151. Last,
foreign trademarked products may drive unbranded native products from the
market. In 1960, for example, the Mexican soft drink market consisted of 50%
Mexican beverages and 50% foreign beverages. Chadnovsky, supra, at 666. Today, only 25% of the market consists of Mexican beverages while 75% of the
market has been captured by foreign products. Id. The power of foreign trademarks is surely one reason why 42% of the Mexican market is dominated by
Coca-Cola. Id. Hostility of the lesser developed nations towards foreign trademarks is now manifested in legislation. Some nations are pushing for the abolition of trademarks in certain sectors of the market (specifically, pharmaceuticals), while others are militating for combination trademarks in which foreign
manufacturers would only be allowed to display their trademark in conjunction
with a local mark. Wassermann, supra note 58, at 85. Little research, however,

has been done regarding the benefits and costs of trademarks to developing
countries. Greer, The Economic Benefits and Costs of Trademarks:Lessons for
the Developing Countries, 7 WORLD Dsv. 683 (1979).

153. 1978 Y.B.
Associations).

INT'L

ORGANIZATONs Entry A0462 (Union of International
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of Rome proclaims that the European Economic Community shall
be based on a customs union 15' designed to unify tariff levels,
unify interpretations of customs matters, and, significantly for
counterfeiting investigations, to harmonize community customs

provisions. 1 55 In 1962 an EEC Committee produced a draft Euro-

pean Patent Convention. Two years later the committee produced
a draft Convention for a European Trademark. A European Patent Convention is now in force 5 and work is underway on a final
57
European Trademark Convention.
IV. THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO DISCOURAGE THE
IMPORTATION OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS (CODE)

A.

History of the Code

International commercial support and the confluence of public
and private energies distinguishes the Code from other intergovernmental anticounterfeiting efforts. An overview of past anticounterfeiting efforts illustrates the groundswell of support for
this legislation. Industrial and intergovernmental efforts to protect trademarks began in the mid-1800s.15' After World War H,
several nations attempted to establish the International Trade
Organization (ITO). While officials were awaiting ratification of
the ITO, the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade 59 (GATT)
became effective. ITO ratification never occurred. Thus, GATT
"institutionalized" itself;160 it became "de facto if not de jure an
154. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Mar.
25, 1957, art. 9, reprinted in OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 229
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Treaties].
155. P. MATHIJSEN, A GuIE To EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3d ed. 1980).
156. For a historical discussion of the process, see Towards an EEC Trade
Mark, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 197 (1977).
157. Need for a European Trademark, 11 INTL'REV. INDUS. PROP. & CopyRIGHT L. 174-89 & n.61, 581-87 (1980). Whether the United States will be accorded full or partial participatory status has yet to be determined. Kaikati &
LaGarce, supra note 1, at 60.
158. See supra notes 92-157 and accompanying text.
159. See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S.

No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
160. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL
CASES AND MATERIALS 1084 (2d ed. 1981).

LEGAL SYSTEM:
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international trade organization."1 1 Given its munificent objectives,1 2 the GATT inevitably spotlighted the counterfeiting

problem.
Because of the tremendous explosion of international counterfeiting during the early 1970s, the first large-scale discussions of
an anticounterfeiting code occured at the 1973 GATT negotiations (the Tokyo Round).1 3 The ninety-nine participating nations 8 4 discussed six groups of problems;'1 5 the agenda covering
nontariff measures specifically included customs problems. William Walker 16 began promoting an anticounterfeiting code early
in 1978.17 Drafts circulated during the fall of 1978, but a final
anticounterfeiting code was not among the agreements signed by
the Tokyo Round negotiators in April 1979.16 Following additional negotiations, the United States, the Common Market nations, New Zealand, and Australia tentatively agreed on a draft of
161. G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMAcY-ThE GATT AND
ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES 34 (1975).
GATT members strove to "enter into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tarriffs and other barriers to
trade . . . ." GATT, supra note 159, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (preamble, III).
162. See GATT, supra note 159, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55

U.N.T.S. 194 (preamble, III).
163. Since the end of World War I, seven multilateral meetings have been
held to negotiate GATT matters. Prior to the Tokyo Round, the Kennedy
Round ran from 1962 until 1967. Walker, supra note 34, at 121. The United

States, Japan, and the EEC were the entities originally supporting the new (Tokyo) round of negotiations. GATT: A Legal Guide to the Tokyo Round, 13 J.
L. 436 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tokyo Round]. The Tokyo
Round was an ideal forum for discussion of the counterfeiting problem. The
Kennedy Round had resulted in massive efforts to lower tariffs and there was a
general feeling that the Tokyo talks should be oriented towards nontariff barrier
problems. Walker, supra note 34, at 121.
164. The participants included 70 GATT members, three provisional members, and 26 nonmembers. See Tokyo Round, supra note 163.
165. The six topical groups included: (1) tropical products; (2) tarriffs; (3)
nontariff measures (with special subgroups on quantative restrictions, technical
barriers to trade, customs matters, subsidies and countervailing duties, and government procurement); (4) agriculture; (5) sector approach; and (6) safeguards.
WORLD TRADE

Id.
166. Mr. Walker is an attorney for the Coalition. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
167. Fenby, supra note 10, at 140.
168. Walker, supra note 34, at 122.
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the Code.169 By February 1982 the United States, the Common
Market nations, and Japan had reached a consensus on a specific
draft of the Code. 170 A few technical problems still prevent agreement between Japan and the Common Market nations.17 1 Addi-

tionally, the Canadians have submitted comments on the proposed text.17 2 Australia's extensive Asiatic trade with nations that
are the source of much counterfeited merchandise may make the
Australians skittish about signing any anticounterfeiting agreement.17 3 Negotiations over draft versions of the Code are continuing with a view to presenting a draft version of the Code for consideration at the GATT administrative meeting scheduled for
November 1982.174
B. The Code Provisions
The Code consists of a preamble, nine articles, and several
notes. According to article 6, the notes are to be used to interpret
their respective articles. 1 75 The preamble discusses the need for
the Code,17 the goals of the signatories, 17 7 and the authority

169.
170.

Fenby, supra note 10, at 140.
Flynn Conversation I, supra note 7.

171. Under Japanese law, the government cannot act on behalf of an individual trademark owner because the government's mandate is to act "in the public
interest." Id. The Japanese originally felt that the emphasis in the proposed
Code on aiding the individual trademark owner was not "in the public interest."
Id. Ms. Flynn, however, believes that the Japanese now realize that because
counterfeiting poses such a detriment to the consumer, actions taken to minimize the problem fall within the ambit of "the public interest." Id. The Japanese also demand assurances that all ten EEC nations can .comply with the
Code; they are particularly concerned with compliance by Belgium and Luxem-

bourg. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Conversation with Ms. Kathryn Flynn, Office of the United States
Trade Representative-General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) Affairs
(Sept. 9, 1982).

175. Code, supra note 8, § 6.1.
176. Clause five of the preamble indicates that trade in counterfeit goods
harms purveyors of legitimate products. Clause six acknowledges that counterfeit merchandise deceives consumers. Id. preamble, cls. 5 & 6.
177. These goals include deterring counterfeiting, id. cls. 2, 3, & 4; increasing
international cooperation to solve the counterfeiting problem, id. cl. 7; and
bringing counterfeiting under "more effective" control. Id. cl. 10. Article XX of
the GATT empowers the parties to enact procedures to protect trademarks. Id.
cls. 1, 2.
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under which the Code is to be enacted. Article 1 delineates the
scope of the Code: parties will discourage trade in counterfeit
goods "that are in the process of being, or are likely to be imported in a manner that deprives the persons involved of the economic benefits of the transaction and deters international trade
in such goods. ' 178 The Code excludes "nominal quantities of
goods intended for personal use and not for sale." 179 Article 1 also
defines "counterfeit goods,"18 0 "trademarks,"181 and "country of
importation. 1 8 2 Article 2 sets forth the parties' obligations. Parties must allow aggrieved entities to submit written requests for
investigations to "appropriate authorities of the country of importation." 181 The burden to provide "satisfactory evidence" that
counterfeit goods are involved is then placed upon the entity requesting investigation.184 Article 2 authorizes "the detention or
seizure ... or the taking of other appropriate measures to retain
jurisdiction over. . . the goods,"1815 and also allows for "alternative procedures consistent with the objectives" of the Code. 88 Additional sections discuss the process for determining whether

goods are counterfeit. 18 7

The article 3 disposal provisions are central to the effectiveness
of the Code. Section 3.2 provides that "[tlo the greatest extent
possible, counterfeit goods should be subject to forfeiture and
should be disposed of outside the channels of commerce in a manner that minimizes harm to the owner of the trademark right
... . 2188 Alternative methods of disposal are allowed if they effectively deter trade in the counterfeit goods.18 Appeal rights of
the parties are covered by article 4.19O Article 5 contains information exchange provisions. 19'
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. § 1.1.
Id.
Id. § 1.2.1.
Id. § 1.2.2.
Id. § 1.2.3.
Id. § 2.1.
Id. § 2.2.
Id. § 2.3.1.
Id. § 2.3.2.
Id. §§ 2.6-.7
Id. § 3.2.
Id.
Id. § 4.1.

191. Id. §§ 5.1-.3.
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The enforcement provisions of article 7 are critical both to the
day to day workability of the Code and to its functioning as a
source of international norms. This article establishes an oversight committee

2

and requires the parties to enter into mutual

consultations at the request of any other party.19 If this method
of dispute settlement is unsatisfactory, the committee will meet
to resolve the matter' 9 and may refer the matter to a panel. 9 5 In
cases of serious violations, the committee is empowered to authorize a party to suspend application of the Code. 9 '
The Code specifically provides for "Special and Differential
Treatment" for developing countries.19 7 The final provisions enu-

merated in article 9 include Acceptance and Accession,'

Reser-

20 2
20
Entry into Force,200 National Legislation, ' Review,
Amendments, 0 3 Withdrawal, 20 4 Non-Application of the Agree-

vations, 9 9"

ment Between Certain Parties,20 5 Secretariat provisions,20" Deposit provisions,207 and Registration provisions.208
C.

Workability of Various Code Provisions
1. The Code as a Deterrent

The preamble of the Code indicates that the drafters' major

goal is the deterrence of counterfeiting. 09 Thus, attention must
192. Id. § 7.1.1. This committee is to be composed of representatives of the

signatory nations.
193. Id. § 7.2.1.
194. Id. § 7.3.1.
195. Id. § 7.3.2. Details are provided regarding the actions of and membership on the panels. Id. §§ 7.3.2.1. to 3.2.3, 7.3.3 to 3.7, 7.4.1. to 4.4.

196. Id. § 7.5.1.
197. Id. §§ 8.1-2.
198. Id. §§ 9.1.1 to 1.5.
199. Id. § 9.2.1.
200. Id. § 9.3.1.
201. Id. §§ 9.4.1-.2.
202. Id. §§ 9.5.1-.3.
203. Id. § 9.6.1.
204. Id. § 9.7.1.
205. Id. § 9.8.1.
206. Id. § 9.9.1.
207. Id. § 9.10.1.
208. Id. § 9.11.1.
209. Id. preamble, cls. 2, 3, 4. The Code does not define the term "deterrence." In the preamble, the drafters refer to depriving "parties to the importa-

tion of counterfeit goods of the economic benefits." Id. cl. 8. In article 3, section
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be focused on whether deterrence is a valid goal, whether counterfeiting can be deterred, and whether the Code will provide the
requisite deterrence. Two scenarios suggest that deterrence is not
a panacea. First, if counterfeiters are deterred from selling their
products only in the signatory state markets,21 0 the many nonsignatory nations will still provide ready markets in which counterfeiters can peddle their wares.21' Second, if the Code is only
1, however, the drafters discuss the elimination of economic incentives to counterfeiting and the need for deterrence as two separate concepts. The general
scheme of the Code suggests that it aims for economic deterrence, since the
Code's main threat to counterfeiters is seizure of their products.
210. Taiwan, for example, is the source of approximately 60% of all counterfeited goods. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Three of Taiwan's four
major trading partners are potential Code signatories: The United States, Japan,
and the Federal Republic of Germany. 1980-1981 STATESMAN'S Y.B. 351 (1981).
Two of Singapore's three main trading partners are considering signing the
Code: the United States and Japan. Id. at 1055. Singapore is yet another major
source of counterfeit merchandise. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Italy, Thailand, Korea, India, and Japan are also counterfeiting centers. Signifi-

cantly, many of their chief trading partners are possible Code signatories. Italy's
main trading partners are the EEC and the European Free Trade Association
nations. HAMMOND ALMANAC 597 (1982). The United States, Japan, Malaysia,
and Hong Kong are among Thailand's main trading partners. Id. at 675. South
Korea's major trading partners include the United States and Japan. Id. at 607.
211. Although consumer preferences in developing nonsignatory nations may
differ from preferences in the more developed economies of the signatory nations, the economic realities, legal structures, and government attitudes in these
nonsignatory nations guarantee ripe markets for counterfeit goods. The demand
for consumer goods in developing countries often outstrips the existing supply.

As a result, substandard products are often marketed. Wassermann, United Nations Consumer Protection Survey, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 776-80 (1979)
(description of June 8, 1978 survey entitled Consumer Protection: A Survey of
Institutional Arrangements and Legal Measures, U.N. Doc. E/1978/81). This
survey was based upon the replies of 19 nonsocialist nations. Id. at 85. United
Nations organizations are often the only source of consumer protection in these
nations. These organizations-UNIDO (industrial standardization), WHO (safe
water supplies and food additives), and FAO (food additives)-tend to focus on
physical health as opposed to consumer rights aspects of consumer protection.
Id. at 82. Not suprisingly, these sociological undercurrents are reflected in the
patent and trademark protection offered by these nations. For example, the
Third World's principal objection to the Paris Convention is that it was established by industrialized nations to protect patent holders-not to help the lesser
developed countries in which many of these patents are used. See generally J.
SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 160, at 1048 (citing Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries of Nov. 11, 1963, reprinted in UNCTAD BAsIc
DOCUMENTS 8, 10 (1963)).
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minimally effective in deterring counterfeiting, the signatory nations will be committed on paper to fight commercial counterfeiting but not required to constantly update their anticounterfeiting
technology. Thus, they may regard Code-mandated activities as
pro forma. The periodic meetings of signatory nations may not
maintain industry interest. The current attack on the counterfeiting problem is motivated by industrial self-preservation. Perhaps
it is syllogistic to suggest that industry will place too much reliance on the Code if it provides respite from counterfeiting activities. Yet this argument is provocative; it would be fatal for industry to relax its vigil because the governments of the signatory
nations-the enforcers of the Code-will depend on private industry for technology necessary to identify increasingly sophisticated counterfeiting operations.
Even if deterrence is a valid goal, it may be unworkable. All
deterrence theories are based on the notion that "human behaviour can be influenced by incentives."2 12 But counterincentives
also exist. Counterfeiting is lucrative,2 13 is a low risk enterprise,2 1 '
and is not difficult. In short, these tremendous incentives will outweigh all but the most severe sanctions. Thus, it is doubtful
whether the Code will substantially deter counterfeiting.
The structure of the counterfeiting community also militates

against deterrence. Authorities admit that organized crime is involved in counterfeiting.2 15 Legions of prosecutors have tracked
alleged organized crime involvement in drug traffic, 21 6 gambling,

212.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: EsTi-

MATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES

19 (1978). For

a

general discussion about the application of deterrence theory in various contexts
see J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 84-109 (1952) (deterrence of specific types of offenses); L. DAVIs, LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTIONS: DETERRENCE AND
THE NEW AMERICAN DOCTRINE (1976) (deterrence from a political science perspective); J. SINGER, DETERRANCE, ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT (1962) (arms
control); F. ZIMMING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973) (crime control
-general).
213. See supra notes 34-43.
214. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
216. See generally UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY: A REPORT BY THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION

OF

JUSTICE 187 (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMIsSION]; FBI's War on Mafia - Better Luck this Time U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 25, 1980, at 25; Kohn, Let's Take the Profit out of Organized Crime,
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and myriad other activities217 -largely to no avail. Decisions by a
handful of nations to apply the Code will not render counterfeiting significantly less lucrative in a world of ripe markets. Thus,
organized crime will remain involved.
Other structural aspects of the counterfeiting community suggest that counterfeiting will never be deterred. A trademark manager for Beecham Products noted that a raid in Taiwan slowed
down the counterfeiting of their product, but may have caused
the counterfeiters to shift their focus to the products of companies that are less aggressive in their approach to the counterfeiting problem. 218 The trademark manager's concern would remain
under the proposed Code: the Code requires aggrieved companies
to initiate customs investigations.2 9 This shift from one illegal
enterprise to another is common. Lawrence I. Kaplan of the Recording Industry Association of America, testifying at the Criminal Code Review hearings, highlighted a similar problem in the
record industry: "As more and more states enacted laws against

[record] piracy, illicit manufacturers turned to consumer deception. Unknown artists would be hired to imitate the singing styles
of famous singers .... -220 Nations which are unable to marshal
needed manpower, resources, and technology to detect shipments
of counterfeit goods should be loathe to push counterfeiters to
greater heights of deception.
Even if counterfeiting could be deterred, the key definitions in
article 1 of the Code are not responsive to the current counterfeiting problem. As discussed earlier,22 1 the grey area between initated and counterfeited goods allows many counterfeiters to circumvent anticounterfeiting laws by arguing that they merely
imitated the original product. The note to article 1 specifically
states that the scope of the Code is limited to "imported goods
with false trademarks that are identical or substantially indistinREADER'S DIG., May 1979, at 145.

217. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 216, at 189-90.
218. Product Poachers,supra note 36, at 15.
219. Code, supra note 8, § 2.
220. District of Columbia Criminal Code Revisions: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the JudiciaryComm. on the District of Columbia House of Representatives in Conjunction with the JudicialComm. of the Council and the Law
Revision Comm. of the District of Columbia, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1977)
(statement of Lawrence I. Kaplan of the Recording Industry Association of
America).

221.

See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
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guishable from the legally protected mark and not lesser infringements.11222 The Code does not cover imitations. The inclusion of a
status quo definition of "trademark" merely perpetuates the current problem of "imitated" counterfeit goods.
Other counterfeiting problems are also excluded from the scope
of Code protection. Nations applying the Code will have no mandate to stop the importation of products bearing slightly altered
trademarks (e.g., Aseikon).225 This problem is exacerbated because popular recognition-the quality that renders a trademark
valuable-depends more upon the general visual image of the
trademark than upon the exact positioning of specific words or

letters.224
Internal corporate corruption poses an additional barrier to the
complete deterrence of counterfeiting. This corruption creates

problems which even an ambitious Code cannot counter. For example, Fioricci, the Italian jeans manufacturer, was charged with

counterfeiting and marketing its own product!

25

Corporations

often inadvertently hire unscrupulous individuals to serve as official dealers. These dealers have ready access to the legitimate

product and are able to counterfeit that product at their leisure. 228 Just as the United States Model Business Corporations

222. Code, supra note 8, note to art. 1.
223. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
224. See Chadnovsky, supra note 152, at 679 & n.11. As a United States
Trade Commissioner traveling in the beginning of this century through the developing world incisively commented:
Against a 50% literacy in Chile, there is less than a 20% literacy in Peru.
However, even the Peruvian Indian, who constitutes the bulk of the population, has learned to ask for things that he identifies by primitive symbols
...A manufacturer of 'machetes'... had been doing an excellent business throughout interior Peru. Perhaps his machete was no better than
other makes, but the Indians thought so. The name on the blade meant
little or nothing to them, for they could not read. Its distinguishing feature
was its bright blue paper wrapper. When the dealer sent a duplicate order,
he either forgot to specify the color of the wrapper or the manufacturer
decided that any color of paper would do. But the Indians firmly refused
to buy until the dealer had sent all the way to Lima for a supply of the
familiar blue paper and had wrapped the knives himself. Then the Indians
recognized the distinguishing mark that to them indicated a certain quality or brand.

Id.
225. Hansen, supra note 21, at 72. Fiorucci was also caught shipping counterfeit Levis and Wrangler jeans through their distribution process. Id.
226. See Kaikati & LaGarce, supra note 1, at 54.
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Act exhaustively specifies every aspect of corporate life except the
quality of the people filling corporate positions, the Code is unable to control the "human factor" in the counterfeiting problem.
2.

General Workability Problems

Five areas of the Code present workability problems. First, the
Code attaches insufficient importance to the involvement of
skilled people in national enforcement. The drafters envisioned
"administrative action, such as intervention by the customs authorities .... 22 But the drafters were caught between Scylla
and Charybdis. Nations deal with trademark infringements in
three ways: enforcement through court actions, enforcement
through the actions of customs officials, or enforcement through
administrative organizations such as trademark offices. 228 Under
these circumstances, mandating that only customs officials deal

with counterfeiting questions would have presented an unworkable framework. Under the permissive language of the Code, a nation may appoint "appropriate" noncustoms personnel to whom
requests for inspections of incoming merchandise are to be submitted. This proviso presents the danger that insufficiently
skilled personnel will be required to perform the section 2.3.1
functions. On the other hand, placing an additional burden on
national customs personnel is also an unsatisfactory solution. In
this period of economic uncertainty and growing international unrest, customs appropriations suffer. Despite an expected eighteen
percent increase in the number of entries in fiscal year 1982,229
United States customs officials planned to eliminate 625 full time
positions 230 and requested $8,467,000 less for fiscal year 1982 than
they had received in the previous year.2 31 Suffering, but aware of
political realities, William T. Archey, Acting Commissioner of
227. Code, supra note 8, note to art. 2.1.
228. Flynn Conversation I, supra note 7.
229. Id. at 304 (remarks of Mr. William T. Archey, Acting Commissioner of
Customs). In fiscal year 1980 cargo valued at $238 billion was processed at over
10,000 checkpoints at more than 300 ports of entry. Id. at 259.
230. Id. at 274. Note that General Accounting Office reports consistently
have recommended improving cargo-selection systems-the procedure by which
customs officials decide which incoming cargo to inspect. Id. at 304 (comments
of Mr. Roybal, Committee Chairperson).
231. Appropriations Hearings, supra note 12, at 252 (remarks of Mr. John
P. Simpson, Acting Assistant Secretary of Enforcement and Operations, United
States Customs Service).
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Customs, referred to "a major work load/resources imbalance
problem. 2'

32

In other countries the question is not whether cus-

toms officials have the funding needed to pursue anticounterfeiting activities, but rather whether they have adequate authority to
do S0.233
Second, national authorities are required by the Code to "take
the necessary steps to provide for the detention or seizure of such
goods or the taking of other appropriate measures;"23 4 forfeiture
is required "[t]o the greatest extent possible. 23 5 Walker argues
that this recognizes that nations may employ differing procedures236 and emphasizes the need for strong monitoring provisions. 237 The review provisions in section 9.5, however, are merely
advisory. Lack of resources and authority thus critically limit the

efficacy of the Code.
Third, the burden placed on individual corporations, coupled
with the vague description of national responsibilities, offers minimal improvement over the status quo. The Code requires individual corporations to assume responsibility in three areas: they
must initiate the investigative process by submitting a written request; 238 they must accompany the request with "satisfactory evi-

dence that counterfeit goods are in the process of being or are
likely to be imported"; 23 9 and they may be required to provide a
security bond.24 0 Because the Code does not require nations to

232. Id. at 261-62. To combat this "workload/resources imbalance," a new
customs computer, an automated broker interface system, and a regulatory audit program are being tested. Id.
233. William Walker explained the differences in the various procedures:
The kind of procedures adopted under United States law, which delegate
significant administrative discretion to the Customs Service, are not suitable for most European Governments whose legal systems are organized
upon civil codes and where administrative discretion is much more narrowly circumscribed. Generally in these countries, customs officials are authorized only to detain suspect merchandise for a very short period of time
... and the trademark owner must... [seek] an injunction.... Governments have been reluctant to limit judicial discretion in such cases. ...
Walker, supra note 34, at 129.
234. Code, supra note 8, § 2.3.1.
235. Id. § 3.2.
236. Walker, supra note 34, at 129.
237. Id.; see Code, supra note 8, §§ 7.4.4, 9.5.1, 9.5.3.

238. See Code, supra note 8 § 2.1.
239. Id. 8 2.2.
240. Id. 8 2.5.
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pursue detection of counterfeit merchandise, it shifts the burden
of action to private corporations. As indicated by the desperate
organizational 2 1 efforts and massive financial 242 expenditures of
the world's largest companies, these entities already assume a
lion's share of the burden. Thus the Code neither redistributes
nor adequately redefines the course of action needed to minimize
the counterfeiting problem.
Fourth, the disposal provisions in article 3 also raise several
workability problems. Although forfeiture of the illicit goods is
suggested in "special circumstances," "other measures" are permitted. 24 3 The Code mandates that the laws of the member na-

tion into which the product is imported 244 will govern counterfeiting questions. The current complaint, however, is that local laws
are ineffective and allow counterfeited products to reenter the
stream of commerce.2 45 Furthermore, although the Code can dic-

tate common goals, it cannot change national judicial practices or
attitudes. Nations with less than optimal committment to the
Code are free to choose "other measures" and thus perpetuate the
status quo. Indeed, should these nations wish to institute forfeiture provisions, they can follow the United States example and do
so without the Code. Ineffective national laws also negate the
value of the appeal provisions in article 4. The right to appeal
means little if the aggrieved party's rights will be determined
under local laws which fail to deter counterfeiters.4 6 Furthermore, the parties are only required to provide this right of appeal
to persons with a "legitimate interest" 247-an undefined class of
persons.
Last, article 7 of the Code presents several enforcement
problems. Given the universal perception that nations have been
lax in complying with GATT, 4 s compliance with an instrument

241.

See supra notes 92-139 and accompanying text.

242. See supra note 106.
243. Code, supra note 8, § 3.2.
244. See id. § 1.2.2.
245. See supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text.
246. Id.

247. Code, supra note 8, § 4.1.
248. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A
Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 2 (1979) (concern
about lax GATT procedures and enforcement so great that the United States

Congress added a request that United States representatives to GATT work on
upgrading the GATT "decision-making procedures"); id. at 2 & n.9. (concern of
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promulgated under GATT should not be taken for granted. The
dispute settlement process described in section 7.3, however, may
increase compliance. Under this process, any party can request
consultations concerning common problems. If necessary, these
issues should be referred up to the Committee for further consideration. 50 If the Committee is unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion, it should establish a panel to examine the matter.2 51 If
this panel is unable to reach a satisfactory solution, it has recourse to the Committee252 which "may authorize a Party or Parties to suspend in whole or in part, for such time as may be necessary, the application of this Agreement to any other Party or
Parties, as is determined to be appropriate in the circumstances. ' ' 25 3 Compliance is achieved at a relatively high cost. Section 9.8.1 provides that the Code will not apply between two parties if, at the time of acceptance, either of the parties does not
consent to application of the Code vis-a-vis the other.254 Questions of reciprocity often arise between nations, but agreeing to
suspend the Code in certain circumstances is antithetical to Code
goals. Although there is symbolic value in having a nation committed on paper to Code goals, the price of the commitment may
be too high. If nations are allowed to pick and choose with whom
they intend to cooperate, achievement of the Code's deterrence
and cooperation goals will be hindered.

other officials about noncompliance with GATT); id. at 2 & n.8 (concern of
GATT officials about noncompliance with GATT).
249.
250.
251.
252.

Code, supra note 8, § 7.2.1.
Id. § 7.3.1.
Id. § 7.3.2.
Id. § 7.3.6.

253. Id. § 7.5.1. Kathryn Flynn explained that this clause tracks dispute settlement mechanisms in other GATT agreements. Flynn Conversation I, supra
note 6. Under the Code, supra note 7, if country X and country Y are engaged
in a dispute, and the Commission makes a recommendation which country Y
refuses to follow, the Commission can authorize country X to suspend its application of the Code vis-a-vis country Y. United States officials, however, feel that
this provision will be invoked only in the rarest of circumstances. Flynn Conversation I, supra note 6. Ms. Flynn emphasized that only once in the 33 year history of GATT has a provision similar to this one been invoked. Id. Normally,
consensual discussion provides an optimal dispute settlement mechanism. Id.
254. Code, supra note 8, § 9.8.1.
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ANALYSIS OF THE NORM-CREATING PROPERTIES OF THE CODE

A. Introduction
Code proponents are hopeful that the Code will gain currency
in international law through the normative process. William
Walker, a chief proponent of the Code, explains that, "[a]s discouragement of counterfeiting becomes an accepted international
norm, under the influence of the international code, nations
which now countenance the practice may be induced by diplomatic action to do more about preventing it. '255 Determining the
meaning Walker attributed to the phrase "discouragement of
counterfeiting becomes an international norm," and whether he
was correct, requires a multipartite analysis designed to ascertain
nonsignatories' perceptions.
Although the Code is widely acclaimed as a breakthrough in the
battle against counterfeiting, 25 its significance is largely dependent on the responses of nonsignatories. Because three of the potential Code signatories account for one-half of all world trade,
the initial normative power of the Code is impressive. Any further
"normative pressure ' 2 57 of Code-created rules depends upon the
perceptions and consequent reactions of nonsignatories. If nonsignatories join the movement toward accepting the Code, the sheer
extent of this governmental commitment will extend the force of
Code-created norms. Nevertheless, nonsignatories may not em-

brace the Code in its entirety. If they find only a few Code-created rules or procedures palatable, their incorporation or adaptation of these rules will lend a suasive, quasi-normative force to
the Code. The following contextual analysis attempts to determine which perceptions the Code will engender among
nonsignatories.

255. Walker, supra note 34, at 131.
256. It is a credit to private industry that it has been able to draw attention
to the problem and rally behind the Code as a potential solution. See, e.g., id. at
119. Walker highlights the potential impact of the Code, supra note 8: (1) providing economic deterrence; (2) encouraging assistance from local authorities in
counterfeiting prosecutions; (3) eliminating situations in which local authorities
allow the reexportation of counterfeit goods; (4) creating both national and international anticounterfeiting policies and attitudes. Id. at 124-25.
257. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1971).
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B. The Code as a Norm-Creating Vehicle
1. InternationalLegal Norms Defined and Described
a.

The Code as a norm-creating vehicle

The Code can promote an anticounterfeiting norm because it is
presented in a type of document which can serve as a norm-creating vehicle. Initially, the Code must be differentiated from other
codes of conduct. Viewed on a continuum describing the legal
character of agreements, the Code falls somewhere between
"[c]onventions embodying definite legal obligations ' 2

8

and codes

which are not legally binding. Nonbinding codes have several distinguishing characteristics. A nonbinding instrument may be created when a governing entity uses something less than its most
official normative pronouncements as a vehicle to approve the
new instrument.2 9 A nonbinding instrument may also be created
if compliance with the agreement is merely voluntary. 260 The
Code certainly does not fall within this second category. GATT
Article XX empowers GATT members to enact this type of
code26 1 and the language of the Code is neither precatory nor generalized. Thus, the Code is something more than a nonbinding
document.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Code is similar to multilateral conventions which compose "the top layer of 'hard' international law.

'2 62

This convention is one of the three sources of

international law described in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.26 3 Yet many current codes of conduct are not viewed as "hard" international law. This is not because codes are improper means by which to create binding law,
but rather because nations do not choose to enact these codes via
258. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for MultinationalEnterprises, 1979 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 11, 14.
259. A code to which the EEC foreign ministers agree,.absent issuance of a

normative regulation or directive, is an example of a nonbinding code. The EEC
central organs have the power to use these normative vehicles; a code deriving

EEC authorization through anything less than a regulation or directive would
not have the same binding nature. Id. at 14.
260. Id. at 14-15.
261. Code, supra note 8, preamble, cl.2.

262. Baade, supra note 258, at 14.
263. The three sources of international law are international conventions, international custom, and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a)-(c) (1947).
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conventions.2 6 4 The proposed Code, however, is to be signed as an

exercise of the parties' article XX rights. Although not completed
during the most recent round of GATT negotiations, the Code is
modeled after other GATT agreements.265 Thus, in the hierarchy
of international law sources, the Code may assume the suasive
force of a convention, and its signatories will accord it appropriate dignity as a source of international obligations. Nonsignatories then will perceive the authority of the vehicle chosen to articulate this anticounterfeiting goal.
b. Norms and the law formation process
Many theorists have pondered the relationship of norms to the
law creating process.2 6 The law or legal order is essentially the
systemic interaction of norms.267 Thus "[r]ules of law are distinct
from legal norms which are described by rules of law."'2 6 The
terms "norms," "customs," and "principles" are interchangeable; 269 legal customs, norms, and principles are described by rules
of law. The creation of a norm is a multipartite process:
1. The formulation and designation of a requirement as to behavior
in contingent circumstances;
2. An indication that that designation has been made by persons
recognized as having the competence (authority or legitimate role)
to perform that function and in accordance with procedures accepted as proper for that purpose;
3. An indication of the capacity and willingness of those concerned
to make the designated requirement effective in fact;
4. The transmittal of the requirement to those to whom it is addressed [the target audience];
5. The creation in the target audience of responses-both psycho-

logical and operational-which indicate that the designated reto be comquirement is regarded as authoritative... and as likely
270
plied with in the future in some substantial degree.

264. Baade, supra note 258, at 14.
265. Walker, supra note 34, at 122.
266. For a comparison of regular social norms and legal norms, see Kelsen,
THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (pts. 1 & 2), 50 LAW. Q. REV. 474 (1934), 51 LAw. Q.
REV. 517 (1935).

267.
6
268.
269.
270.

LAW

See id. at 517-22; see also H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
(1952).
Kelsen, supra note 266, at 517-22.
1 M. WHIrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963).
Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, in THE
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The process by which a norm develops is the same assimilative
process by which customary international law evolves. Therefore,
if the Code creates norms it will also create customary international law.
c. The evolution of Code-created norms
(i) The significance of usage and opinion.-Because the customary law creation process is the norm creation process, analyzing the evolution of Code rules requires identifying the assimilative steps in the customary international law formation process.
Because this Note analyzes the future normative potential of the
Code, it would be analytic legerdemain simply to assert that customary international law evolves. Professor Anthony D'Amato approaches the law formation problem through the two elements of
custom: usage and opinio juris seu necessitatas.271 "Usage" is repeated practice-the material aspect of customary 'international
law. The second element expresses the psychological aspect of the
law formation process: the formation of customary international
law requires the actual exercise of a right. This Note suggests that
the element of usage will occur when nations adopt the Code.
(ii) Usage and customary international law formation.- The
norm creating function of the Code depends on whether the Code
expresses extant or nascent norms. Ratification of the Code will
not bring norms into existence as if by fiat. Although there is no
current anticounterfeiting norm,272 the Code may function as a
norm creating vehicle if it speeds the process by which anticounterfeiting sentiment develops into customary international
law. Traditionally, a rule or proscription qualified as "customary

international law" because it had developed over a long period of
time. 7 Under this analysis, the Code could only create norms if
(1) an anticounterfeiting norm was extant prior to adoption of the
EFFECTIvENEss OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 9, 17 (S. Schwebel ed. 1971).
271. A. D'AMATo, supra note 257, at 49.
272. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
273. Time is not the only indicator of the existence of customary international law. The number of times a rule is adhered to or supported and the actual
continuity of usage also characterize the customary law formation process. A.
D'AMATo, supra note 257, at 59-60. But cf. id. at 66 ("repetition, duration, constancy and generality surely serve to make any given rule more visible, but writers have not given any concrete evidence for the loose statements sometimes
made that these elements are necessary for the actual formation of a rule of
customary law.").
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Code; or (2) if, in the distant future and by virtue of the long
period of time since its enactment, the Code came to be viewed as
representing a universally applied principle. No anticounterfeiting norm is currently extant. In the distant future, however, cumulative usage of the Code may create an anticounterfeiting
norm. This development of Code norms is contingent upon nonsignatories' perceptions that Code rules are sufficiently workable
to warrant adoption.
The Code may also create an international norm in the near
future. The argument that only a long period of time can galvanize a Code-promulgated rule into an international norm is based
on traditional analysis which is currently under challenge. The
"hierarchy" of international law established in the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, however, is itself a product of customary international law. In other words, custom defines customary international law.2 74 Significantly, there is considerable debate 275 about whether the traditional, laborious development of
customary international law appropriately reflects international
behavior in an era of rapid scientific, technological, and political

advancements. Indeed, referring to the development of the equidistance principle, the International Court of Justice noted in the
North Sea Shelf Cases278 that
treating that Article as a norm-creating provision which has constituted the foundation of, or has generated a rule which, while only
conventional or contractual in its origin, has since passed into the
general corpus of international law, and is now accepted as such by
the opinio juris, so as to have become binding even for countries
which have never, and do not, become parties to the Convention....

[T]his process is a perfectly possible one and does from

274. Baade, supra note 258, at 21.
275. See, e.g., The South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgement, 1966 I.C.J.

4, 250 (Tanaka, J., dissenting). D'Amato cites the work of Sir Humphrey
Waldock, Gilberto Amado, James Brierly, and Helen Silving for the proposition
that the time needed to create customary international law may vary according
to the subject of the custom. A. D'AMATo, supra note 257, at 58. One explanation is particularly illustrative: "The establishment of custom required a long

period of time in the past when international life was slower and communication
primitive, but today custom may be formed rapidly since every event of international importance is universally immediately known." Id. at 59 (quoting Karol
Wolfke).
276. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Den. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3,
reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 591. In an 11-6 decision, the court held that the
use of the equidistance principle was not obligatory.
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time to time occur." 2 7

The North Sea Shelf case emphasized that "the process of the
definition and consolidation of the emerging customary law took
place through the work of the International Law Commission, the
reaction of governments to that work and the proceedings of the
Geneva Conference.

'278

This underscores how modern forums

speed the norm creation process. Although the court rejected this
contention, it pointed out that it is "perfectly possible" that a
rule or proscription promulgated in a document may quickly become a binding norm for nonsignatory nations. Similarly, an instrument like the Code, signed in the manner of a multilateral
treaty, could speed the traditionally slow international norm formation process. Once again, the transformation of Code rules into
international norms depends upon nonsignatories' perceptions
that Code-created rules would be to their benefit.
(iii) Opinion and customary international law formation.-The role of the Code as a norm creating vehicle is largely
dependent upon the willingness of nations to exercise rights
under the Code. Although the usage required to solidify the Code
as customary international law is a function of time, identifying
the opinio juris sue necessitatas requires difficult psychological
analysis. The signatory nations will commit themselves to the
Code because it is in their self-interest to do so; this commitment
forms the basis from which any customary anticounterfeiting
norm could develop. First, although nations may accept Code-created rights they will not exercise these rights unless they perceive
that the Code has suasive force. Second, nonsignatories will not
incorporate Code values unless they perceive that the signatories
are willing to exercise rights under the Code. Three perceptions
are necessary: (1) that the Code is an authoritative source; (2)
that the Code commands member state commitment; and (3) that
the Code promotes efficacious rules.
2. The Significance of Nonsignatories' Perceptions of the
Code for the Norm-Creating Process: Perceptions Which the
277. Id. at 620.

278. Id. at 616-17. The embryonic custom, according to one party, was "crystalized in the adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention by the Conference."). Id.
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Code Must Engender to Qualify as a Norm-Creating Vehicle
a. Perception of the Code as an authoritative source
Nonsignatories will not sign the Code or adopt its premises unless they perceive its suasive power. A key jurisprudential question is whether the suasive force of a norm creating vehicle must
flow from the text of the agreement itself or from nontextual (political, social, or economic) origins. At one extreme are the theorists who argue that the absence of sanctions renders international law something less than law.27 9 Conceding the validity of
this theory would, of course, render moot the issue of the Code as
a norm creating vehicle. Other theorists find that natural law or
positive enactment validate international law.280 Positive enactment, however, will only occur when nations find that this enactment is in their self-interest. Enactment is only in a nation's selfinterest when it perceives that the Code is effective. Two elements can create that perception: strong sanctions in the Code or
nontextual principles of international interaction.

The rich legacy of centuries of commercial interaction indicate
that the nations of the world-like the individuals in a community-interact in accordance with certain uncodified principles:
cooperation, good faith, custom, and righteousness. 281 The significance of these customary principles is illustrated by recent patterns of international interaction. As Philip C. Jessup
importuned,
Why have the nations been willing for nearly twenty years to subscribe to a budget of over half a million dollars for the mainte279. See generally L.
MATERIALS

OREFIELD & E. RE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
10 (1965). Austin argued that absent sanctions there can be no inter-

national law. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 270.
280. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, liii, reprinted in J.
SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, CASES AND
MATERIALS 1171 (1973).
281. See supra notes 258 & 279. Proponents of the efficacy of these customary principles of international interaction assume a maximalist stance: member

states will be legally committed to inducing compliance with the Code or to
avoiding the creation of obstructions to its functioning. Baade, supra note 258,
at 30. Minimalists reach an opposite conclusion. A code may be binding, but
minimalists cite the Lotus and Nuclear Tests cases to argue that any document
limiting a state's sovereignty must be restrictively interpreted. See Nuclear
Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection Order of June 22); S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 5 (Judgment of Sept. 7). See
generally Baade, supra note 258, at 31.

848

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15.803

nance of the Permanent Court of International Justice? Why did
the German Government bother to make a legal argument in support of its refusal to accept the demand of the United States that
it assume the obligation to pay the bonded obligations of Austria?
...Why has the United States Supreme Court, like the courts of
most other countries, asserted that "international law is part of our
82
law?,, 2
Over 20,000 international agreements have been concluded since
1945.283 These agreements are testimony to the pervasive perception that nations will cooperate in accordance with certain uncodified principles to facilitate international commercial
interaction.

b.

Perception that the Code commands member state
commitment

Nonsignatories' willingness to incorporate Code values is also

dependent upon their perception that the Code commands the
signatories' obedience. Customary nontextual principles of international interaction indicate both that member nations will obey
the Code and that nonsignatories will be aware of this commitment. One customary rule of international interaction is the duty
of good faith.28 4 The terms of an instrument ratified by a state
represent national policy; the state cannot in good faith contravene the principles of that instrument. 5 Other foundations of international obligations also induce compliance with agreements.
Among these foundations are the following: consent, custom,
righteousness, national law, social necessity, international consensus, direct institutions, common purpose of participants, effectiveness, sanctions, shared expectations regarding authority, and
rules of recognition.2 8 6 Nonsignatory nations cannot fail to perceive a strength of purpose flowing from acts of ratification evidencing the signatories' shared expectations that counterfeiting
282.

Jessup, THE REALITY OF

INTERNATIONAL LAw,

18 FOREIGN AFr. 244, 245-

46 (1940).
283.

Sohn, The Effectiveness of InternationalLaw, in EssAYs ON INTERNA58, 59 (M. Nowaz, ed. 1976). For a discussion of the myriad confer-

TIONAL LAW

ences spawning these agreements, see id. at 161.
284. Baade, supra note 258, at 28.
285.
286.

Id. at 38.
Schachter, supra note 270, at 9-10.
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must, as a matter of righteousness and social necessity, be
deterred.
Minor Code violations will not necessarily weaken nonsignatories' perceptions of the Code as a norm creating vehicle. Professor
Louis Sohn points out that crimes occur despite our system of
penal law and that strikes occur despite our system of labor
law.287 Nevertheless, few would champion the elimination of criminal and labor regulations. Similarly, minor Code violations will
be viewed, not as an insurmountable difficulty, but rather as an
inherent part of the regulatory process.
c.

Perception that the Code promotes efficacious rules

The efficacy of Code rules is closely linked to the normative
potential of the Code. Because many political, social, and economic considerations will influence the signatory and nonsignatory decision makers who evaluate the desirability of accession to Code-created rules, contextual analysis is needed to
determine whether these decision makers will perceive the Code
as creating efficacious rules. The argument is twofold: nations will
not ratify the Code or exercise rights thereunder unless the Code
rules are perceived to be effective; and nonsignatories will not
perceive the Code as a potential source of international law unless
the Code rules are perceived to be effective.
3. The Impact of Nonsignatories' Perceptions of the Code on
the Development of an InternationalAnticounterfeiting Norm.
a. The McDougal-Lasswell approach: neo-realistic functional
analysis
The "policy-oriented 288 contextual jurisprudence developed by
Professors Myers McDougal and Harold Lasswell provides an
ideal approach for determining whether nations will perceive
Code-created rules as efficacious. Although the McDougal-Lasswell approach is designed to optimize decision making, their emphasis on the communication of shared values is uniquely suited
to analysis of the nonsignatories' perceptions of the Code as a
norm creating vehicle. In essence, the question is whether nations
with differing values, legal systems, social structures, trade prac287. Sohn, supra note 283.
288. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,

TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

349 (1976).

850

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15.803

tices, customs organizations, import needs, export practices,
trademark systems, and perceptions of the counterfeiting problem
will decide that counterfeiters are a common enemy and that integrating Code rules into their national value structures is an effective way to address the problem.
Harmonization of these disparate systemic and structural values will not spring, like Terpsichore, directly from the text of the
Code. Harmonization is a function of the shared communications

emphasized by the McDougal-Lasswell approach. Nonsignatories
will determine whether Code rules express their goals and
whether those rules can be applied in their particular legal systems. Similarly, the signatory nations will have to determine the
extent to which they wish to exercise their rights under the Code
(e.g., they may demand forfeiture of captured counterfeit goods or
merely bar the entry of those goods). In making these decisions, it
would be unwise for decision makers to limit themselves to a textual analysis of the Code. Appropriately, McDougal and Lasswell
shift the analytical focus from the codified law to the process by
which these decisions are made, allowing the analyst to consider
whether it is in the political self-interest of that nation to accept

Code-promoted values.
Understanding contextual analysis involves acknowledging the
jurisprudential legacy upon which McDougal and Lasswell built,

and from which they dissented. Their formalist predecessors espoused 289 an inherently tenacious discipline which "defines legal
289. Wallace & Fiocco, Recent Criticismsof Formalismin Legal Theory and
Legal Education,7 ADEL. L. REV. 309 (1980). Reduced to a basic set of propositions, the earlier formalist legal theory can be characterized as:
(a) A conception of law as an autonomous discipline with its own methodology, rationality and history. Typical devices of the discipline to control
cognition are legal logic, a system of hierarchical rules, dichotomous definitions, and an entrenched concentration of analysis on the appellate court
judge.
(b) A pattern of evaluation of law and legal institutions which is coloured
heavily by these cognitive controls and which principally measures the internal consistency of rules and their sources to the exclusion of their substantive content and social effect.
(c) A failure to examine the relationship between formal theories of law
and the structural devices which underpin the operation of law. These
structural devices include the use of a highly trained legal profession, a
complex hierarchy of decision-making authorities, an anchronistic language and a high degree of mysticism in the apparatus of law.
(d) A precise and narrow demarcation of the legal form from the non-legal,
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thinking . . . any alternative [to which was to] be treated as

prima facie non-law and hence ignored by the main stream [sic]
of the discipline."290 Pound's criticisms of the pre-realist schools
is applicable: formalist jurisprudence "sought to construct a science of law solely in terms of and on the basis of the law itself. '29 1
Neo-realistic jurisprudence challenges formalist theory. Although several schools of neo-realism developed, all share certain
common characteristics.292 Specifically, neo-realists emphasize the

myriad considerations influencing decision makers. Neo-realists
challenge formalism precisely because modern world interaction
and the concomitant development of international law-making
processes require a cross-disciplinary, not an intradisciplinary,
perspective. T. Olawale Elias characterizes modern international
law2 9 as a "reflection of contemporary social, economic, scientific
and technological needs. '294 In a political mileu bursting with
requiring limited appraisal of the social, political and economic realities
and a striking inability to theorise about purposes and effects of law. Id.
290. Id. at 312.
291. 1 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 12 (1959).

292. Wallace & Fiocco, supra note 289, at 251. For example, proponents of
economic determinism/realism argue that law making and decision making
processes are determined by the assertions of an economically dominant group.
Id. at 255. Psychological realists suggest that law is the decisions of judges, but
emphasize the nonrational element in the decision making process. Id. at 264-65.
Another shared characteristic is their cross-disciplinary perspective. As two Australian legal scholars noted, "[b]uilding on the pragmatism of Holmes, sociological jurisprudence of Pound, the 'realist' theories and the Law, Science and Policy Approach of Lasswell and McDougal, the demand for cross-disciplinary work
has become the most important attack on formalism." Id. at 316-17.
293. Elias views this as the third stage in the development of international
law. Elias, Modern Sources of InternationalLaw, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A
CHANGING SocmTY

34 (1972).

294. Id. at 67. Compare the concept of formalist legal thought, which is divorced from political and social reality, with Elias' view. Formalism is divorced
from political reality because its precepts are applicable in a world in which all
decision making occurs in an apolitical, hierarchical envornment. Politicians,
however, are not legal analysts. Their goal is not discovery of a true rule or ultimate law. The problem is that "formal theory contains an inadequate version of
human decision-making. It constructs an abstract system by concentrating on
instrumental and structural constraints ... without consideration of the very
fragile psychological internalization of their meaning which effectuates the constraints." Wallace & Fiocco, supra note 289, at 314. Formalist legal thought is
also divorced from social reality. Scholars have identified several social functions
which law represents: (1) actual behavior; (2) power allocation-the expression
of consensus values; (3) a tool through which certain behaviors are classified as
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aphorisms such as "arms race," "first strike power," "chemical
stockpiling," "brinksmanship," "imperialism," "four-year plans,"
"five-year plans," and "zero-sum games" and where detente is
merely a stepping stone to an unknown denouement, political
longevity is determined by a decision maker's ability to identify
and promote national self-interest. Unlike the formalist emphasis
on the creation of a framework of hierarchical rules, the McDougal-Lasswell approach focuses on the decision making process.
Because the McDougal-Lasswell approach rejects formal, textual analysis in favor of a functional, contextual approach, it is
uniquely suited to evaluate whether individual decision makers
will perceive adoption of Code rules or values as being in their
national self-interest. These perceptions are key predictive elements in the law formation process. A nation's laws are those
rules that are perceived to be effective2 95 and in the national interest. As Reisman explains:
In virtually every situation, the criterion of a "good decision" is its
degree of conformity to the preferences of the evaluator ....
[L]aw, at least in the past century, has been reluctant to admit
complicity in such criteria, but has insisted that its criterion is in
conformity with certain communications of the past.2 9
Thus, the nonsignatory decision maker's contextual perception

that Code rules are effective is an important indicator of the likelihood that the nonsignatory will assimilate those rules. By the
same token, a signatory decision maker's contextual determination that Code rules are effective will prompt additional exercises
of rights under the Code.
McDougal and Lasswell have established a framework to guide
decision makers. The decision in question must be evaluated as a
process of shared communication. Communication, .in turn, must
be examined contextually. Signs are central to the communication

deviant; (4) a mechanism for providing symbolic reinforcement of norms and
opinions. Id. at 315. Formalists can escape criticism that their analysis of law is
too limited. By defining law, they define the limited parameters of their analysis;
but this does not obscure others, in various disciplines, who have identified myriad sources and functions of law. Thus, like a doctoral candidate defending his
dissertation to a multidisciplinary panel, legal scholars can best validate their
theories by testing them in light of all the social roles of the law making process.
295. M. REISMAN, A Theory About Law From the Policy Perspective,in LAw

AND POLIcY 75, 81 (D. Weisstub ed. 1976).
296. Id.
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process: signs are "materials or energies that are specialized to
the task of mediating between the subjective events of two or
more persons. 2 9 7 Signs evoke certain subjective events which are
299
called symbols,2 98 and signs communicate symbols in forums. It
is necessary to identify the objectives s0 and base values30 1 of forum participants because they impact on the communication
process.

In McDougal's lexicon, interpretation is the alter ego of com-

munication. Interpretation is necessary to discover the "shared
expectations"302 of the communicators.30 3 The act of interpretation involves identifying the parties involved, identifying the
shared objectives of the parties, examining the context of the confrontation, and considering the "whole world social process, '' °
297.

S.

McDOUGAL,

H.

LASSWELL & J. MILLER, INTERPRETATION OF AGREE-

MENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER XV, xii

GAL

(1967) [hereinafter cited as S. McDou-

& H. LASSWELL].

298. Id. at xii.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at xiv.
302. McDougal acknowledges that "[s]ince the subjectivities of the parties
are never open to direct observation, bona fide efforts at interpretation can only
be directed toward signs and acts of collaboration from which the subjectivities
may be inferred." Id. at 29.
303. Id. at xvi. Interpretation is a "responsible effort to ascertain the degree
and content of the genuine shared expectations of the parties to an international
agreement." Id. at 29. Interpretation is differentiated from other phases of the
decision making process. Interpretation involves "designating the shared subjectivities of communicators." Id. at xix. The prescriptive phase examines the assumptions about the allocation of authority in the decision making process. The
promotional phase is the process of reaching consensus. Id. Interpretation involves analysis of content and procedures. Content analysis consists of "arrang[ing] the manifest content of the statements that appear in relevant
texts-including more than a putatively final text-according to harmony or
contradictions, and abstractness." Id. at xviii. Analysis of procedure involves
"examin[ing] each pertinent expression in the order in which it was made and
also in relation to any information that helps to establish the perspectives of the
communicator and his audience." Id. This twofold process creates "an agenda of
experiences that aid in modifying the initial picture of the subjectivities of the
parties." Id.
304. Id. at 15-21. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, McDougal
also suggests that the decision in question be appraised for compatability with
goal values. J. SWEENY, C. OLivER & N. LEECH, supra note 160, at 1220 (citing
McDougal, InternationalLaw, Power & Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 1
RECEUL DES Cours 137 (1953) [hereinafter cited as InternationalLaw, Power &
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the context of the agreement. How the Code communicates to,
and shapes the perceptions of, nonsignatories requires analysis of
(1) the parties; (2) the objectives of the parties; (3) the context of
the confrontation; and (4) the context of the agreement.
b. Application of functional analysis to test nonsignatories'
perceptions of the Code as an authoritative vehicle for creating

efficacious rules
(i) Identifying the parties to the Code. - The parties to the
Code will be the potential signatories. According to the United
States Trade Representative's Office, 305 the nations most likely to
sign the Code are the United States, the Common Market nations,30 6 Japan, Canada, and New Zealand. A common characteristic of these parties is that, with the exception of Italy, these
nations are not major sources of counterfeiting goods.
(ii) The shared objectives of the parties. - McDougal and
Lasswell suggest that the shared objectives of parties to a document can be identified by examining certain signs (materials devoted to solving a problem) and symbols (subjective events
evoked by the signs). The analyst is not limited to the signs and
symbols contained in the text of the document. Because the text
of a document is merely "a set of signs," "it is the grossest, least
defensible exercise of arbitrary formalism to arrogate to one particular set of signs-the text of a document-the role of serving
as the exclusive index of the parties' shared expectations." 307
however, does not preclude textual
Contextual interpretation,
308
interpretation:
The approach which seeks genuine shared expectations does not
neglect any intial version of their relation to shared expectations as
provisional, and requires that the interpreter engage in a course of
Policy]). This last step involves "the invention and evaluation of new alterna-

tives of policy-prescriptions and institutions-designed for the better securing
of such goal values." Id. at 1221. The context of the confrontation includes
"[t]he description of trends in decision, in terms of effects upon values, and the

identification in the greatest degree possible of the variables, predispositional
and environmental, that affect particular decisions." Id. at 1220.
305. The Common Market nations are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom.
306.

S. McDouGAL & H. LAsswELL, supra note 297, at xvii.

307. Id. at xviii.
308. Id.

Fall 1982]

ANTICOUNTERFEITING CODE

sustained testing and revision of preliminary inferences about the
pertinent subjectivities. And of course this calls for a scrutiny of
the whole context of communication. 09
Many nontextual sources exist from which inferences can be
drawn about the parties' objectives. For example, inferences
about shared objectives can be drawn from the following signposts which aid in treaty interpretations:
(1) the general purpose of the treaty;
(2) the historical background of the treaty;
(3) travaux pr~paratoires;
(4) the circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered into;
(5) the change in these circumstances sought to be effectuated;
(6) later documents showing efforts at applying the treaty; and
(7) prevailing conditions at the time the interpretation is
occurring.3 10

Combining these general aids with a modicum of textual analysis provides a cross-disciplinary picture of the parties' shared expectations. This, in turn, helps to delimit the perceptions which

the Code will invoke. The Code itself is an important sign of the
parties' common objectives: the deterrence of counterfeiting
through cooperation, information exhanges, and the minimization
of economic incentives to counterfeiting. Although the Code's title suggests that the common objective is deterring the importa-

tion of counterfeit goods, "prevailing conditions" and the "circumstances at the time" suggest that the parties share a broader
goal: deterring all facets of counterfeiting activity. Another

3' 11
nontextual signpost, "the character of the language involved,

309. Id. at 120-21 & n.6 (citing Harvard Research in International Law,
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, comment 946 (1935)). Similarly, the
following may also be considered:
[T]he character of the language employed, historical facts relating to the
subject matter in question, kindred arrangements showing the practice of
nations in using like terms in other agreements, the general purpose as
deduced from the various aspects of the instrument as a whole, comparisons and contrasts drawn from other parts of the treaty or related agreements, prior negotiations, contemporary declarations, as well as practical
constructions by the parties.
Id. at 120 & n.5. (citing Y. CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OF TRE:ATES BY JuIcAL
TRBuNE 182-83 (1933)).
310. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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must be examined in light of specifically delineated Code goals.
Code language is not consistent with the objective of deterring all
facets of counterfeiting. Because the Code adopts status quo definitions, it does nothing to address the current problem created by
knockoffs 312 and imitations. 1 3 Whether by oversight or by intention, the Code does not indicate an objective to eliminate these
simpler forms of counterfeiting.
A third nontextual signpost is the historical background of the
Code. Because the travaux pr~paratoires have not been published, they cannot identify the shared objectives of the parties.
The United States Trade Representative's Office, however, has
identified two major problems encountered in the drafting of the
Code that help to delimit the parties' shared expectations: coverage and enforcement. Original United States plans to include all
intellectual property rights under Code protection were stymied
by a lack of available technology to run copyright checks at border entry points. Enforcement mechanisms also caused extensive
debate during the drafting of the Code. Because trademark rights
currently are enforced through court action (e.g., court orders to
stop imports), action by customs officials, or action by administrative organizations (e.g., trademark offices), any code mandating

a single enforcement method would be unworkable. Thus, the
Code allows individual nations to appoint "appropriate authorities" to enforce the provisions.3 14 It is thus clear that the parties
did not intend to cover all intellectual property rights. Furthermore, they intend to achieve their objectives by a flexible system
which accounts for differing governmental structures.
(iii) The context of the confrontation. - Trends, predispositional indicators, and environmental variables can shape nonsignatories' perceptions of the Code. One important environmental
variable is government ability. As discussed above, the validity of
deterrence theory in the instant situation is highly questionable.315 Italy provides a perfect case in point. Although the wording of the Code may commit the Italian government to the fight
against counterfeiting, intentions and capability are two separate
issues. As one author noted, "[T]he problem in Italy will continue, whatever the law on the books, until the Italian govern312. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
313. Flynn Conversation I, supra note 7.
314. See supra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
315. Hansen, supra note 21, at 74.
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ment is politically, bureaucratically and economically able to do
something about it.

'3 18

Any Italian commitment pales in compari-

son with "credible estimates" which suggest that twenty to
twenty-five percent of the Italian gross national product is derived from illegal activities 317 and which indicate that up to 2.5
million Italians work in the illegal sector of the economy. 31 8

Another significant environmental factor is the existence of unprotected national borders. Because the Code focuses upon catching counterfeited products at the borders, the ersatz goods will
either flow into unprotected markets or circulate within national
borders. Thus, use of a functional analysis has uncovered a major
workability problem involving this particular Code objective.
Police attitudes are an important predispositional variable
which shape nations' perceptions of the counterfeiting problem.
Police officials may be prone to bribery; 319 there is no reason to
assume that the Code can change these attitudes. Bausch &
Lomb officials annually lose seven to eight million dollars in sales
because of Italian counterfeiting; that company finally accused
the Italian police of failing to enforce trademark laws.32 0 The general attitude in Italy, according to Bausch & Lomb officials, was
that "the companies being ripped off are rich and can afford
it.,,321

Organized criminal activity is another environmental variable
influencing perceptions of the Code as a norm-creating vehicle. As
long as counterfeiting remains lucrative, organized crime will not
be deterred by increased vigilance at the point of importation.
The Code is not designed to eliminate the sources of counterfeit
items. Organized crime will continue to produce them, either circumventing the system totally or choosing unprotected markets
in which to sell the counterfeited products.2 2
Examination of past trends enhances any multidisciplinary
analysis of the parties' goals. For example, the information ex316. Id. at 68.
317. Id. at 70. In Hansen's words, "[T]he borders are so open that Italy
could be mistaken for a free port." Id. Undaunted, he continues: "In fact, judged
by official figures, the continued survival of the Italian economy is a miracle on
the order of flying rocks and snow on the Fourth of July." Id.
318. See supra note 84.
319. Hansen, supra note 21, at 68.
320. Id.
321. See supra notes 88-91.
322. See supra notes 110-35.
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change goal is premised upon the notion that an exchange of information will increase counterfeiting prosecutions. There is a serious danger that this will not occur. First, even if information
exchanges disclose the emergence of a new mode of counterfeiting, local authorities may be powerless to stop importation of the
product if it is shipped in a non-infringing condition. Thus,
Aseikon watches and blank tee-shirts may still cross the border.
Second, strong environmental barriers militate against the information exchange goal. Because the Code does not change local
laws, ineffective" 3 local laws will be used to prosecute those hap-

less counterfeiters who are caught.
Governmental ability, the existence of unprotected borders, police attitudes, the presence of organized crime, and currently ineffective local laws are but a few examples of the trends, predispositional indicators, and environmental variables which form the
context of the current confrontation. This is the political environment in which national decision makers will evaluate the desirability of incorporating Code-created norms into their own national value systems. These variables help to establish the
parameters of nonsignatories' perceptions of the Code. The weaknesses highlighted by these variables decrease the chance that
Code-created rules will be absorbed as customary international
law. It is simply not in a nonsignatory's self-interest to adopt a
set of rules premised upon potentially unworkable goals.
(iv) The context of the agreement. - Because all nations do
not share the signatories' trademark protection ethic, it is unlikely that they will perceive the Code as an authoritative source
of efficacious rules. McDougal's admonishment to examine the
context of an agreement refers to the whole world process as it
relates to the agreement. The most obvious example of the Code's
role in the world process is the line of demarcation between the
developed, industrialized nations and the lesser developed nations. As discussed above, lesser developed nations often place

different values on trademark rights than do the developed nations. 2 Code proponents admit that the Code was not drafted
with the intent of luring lesser developed nations to ratify the
document. If the Code is premised upon a trademark protection
ethic not shared by the nonsignatories, they will not incorporate
Code rules into their national value systems. It is simply not in
323. See supra notes 117-33, 151-52, 316-18 and accompanying text.
324. A. D'AMATO, supra note 257, at 32.
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their self-interest to do so.
VI.

SIGNIFICANCE OF NONSIGNATORIES' PERCEPTIONS OF THE

CODE ASIDE FROM THE NORM-CREATING PROCESS

A.

Introduction

Nonsignatories' perceptions of the Code are important even if
they are not sufficient to persuade those nations to sign the Code.
If nonsignatories adopt or acknowledge any Code principles or
procedures, the Code will have encouraged the most effective national practices. Professor D'Amato analogizes this quasi-norma-

tive process to a roadside stop sign. 25 In D'Amato's hypothetical
community, automobile drivers do not bring their vehicles to a
full stop at the familiar red octagon; instead, they shift into low
gear to slow their vehicles. The stop sign simply does not evoke
compliance. It does, hoWever, have significance because it "functions as kind of 'pressure' upon drivers to slow down." 326 This
slowing down is important because the purpose of the law is to
curb the number of accidents. Similarly, the Code may create
psychological pressure on nonsignatories to improve their anticounterfeiting practices. These improvements will aid both private and governmental entities in investigating and prosecuting
counterfeiters.
B.

The Code as a Source of Quasi-Normative Pressure

The Code may cause nations to "slow down" and examine their
anticounterfeiting procedures because it will be politically expedient for national decision makers to adopt efficacious Code rules.
All national decision makers engage in self-interest analyses. A
decision maker may perceive no benefit in adopting the full panoply of Code rules. Nevertheless, specific rules may be perceived as
offering benefits which far exceed the costs. For example, a nation
may find it desirable from a record keeping standpoint to adopt a
procedure similar to the article 2.1 requirement that counterfeit-

ing investigations be triggered only through written requests. Furthermore, a nation may find it useful to follow the article 3.2 suggestion that counterfeiters forfeit their goods: charity can begin at
home when nations choose not to export their problems. Informal

325. Id.
326. Id.
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information exchanges modeled on article 5.2 may be a valuable
aid in prosecutions. A developed nation which discovers that it is
receiving an unusual number of counterfeiters from one particular
nation may find it desirable to provide the exporting country with
article 8.2 assistance such as the training of personnel, or with
assistance in preparing and implementing anticounterfeiting
measures. The Code may simply encourage national decision
makers to consider new legislation which is in general accordance
with the Code. Thus, the Code offers nations ample reasons to
"slow down" even if they do not want to "stop" to ratify the
Code.
The Code may thus be imbued with quasi-normative qualities.
If nations "slow down" and adopt Code-created practices, their
activities will be a boon to private international entities. Currently stymied by ineffective international laws, private support
for the Code indicates that it will welcome nations adopting even
a few Code-created rules and procedures. In short, these entities
may benefit from the same Code procedures that can benefit the
public international community. Putting an end to the re-exportation problem would eliminate one major complaint. The Code
will supplement existing private information exchanges by requiring nations to do the same. Businesses can only benefit when signatories help nonsignatories in areas such as customs personnel
training.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that the Code will lead to the development of an
international anticounterfeiting norm in either the near or distant
future. First, the concept that customary international law can
develop over a short period of time is too new to be applied in
any but the clearest of cases. Furthermore, severe questions about
the probability that nonsignatories will perceive the Code as a
source of workable rules engendering a high level of member state
commitment weaken the normative potential of the Code.
Because nonsignatories assume that status is a matter of selfinterest, arguing that a norm might develop is tantamount to arguing that nations will find it in their self-interest to appropriate
Code-created rules. Barring the development of a world govern-

ment, however, there is no reason to believe that the future political mileu will differ from the present: a conglomeration of nations
with disparate social and economic values, each at a different
stage of development. Consequently, nations will be unable uni-
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formly to label various anticounterfeiting activities "lawful" or
"normative." It is thus unlikely that an international anticounterfeiting norm will develop in even the distant future.
Even if Code-created rules are relatively unworkable and the
Code is not a norm creating vehicle, it still will play a significant
role in international transactions. First, if the Code comports with
political realities, it represents "law." Terms like "law" and
"norm" are merely labels used to identify shared expectations.
Code rules may not rise to that position of preeminence denoted
by the label "normative." These labeling problems should not disturb one who has accepted a functional approach to the discipline. Only in the most extreme schools of jurispurdential
thought is law "law" because it is labeled as such. Recent juristic
thought indicates that ascertaining the "law" is a multidisciplinary foray which both proceeds from and leads the analyst to a
clear description of economic and political reality. This reality exists independent of the customary international law formation
process. In short, if nonsignatories do not actively circumvent the
Code, it will be internationally significant law simply because it
represents what nations do.
Second, the unique juxtaposition of public and private interest
in the counterfeiting problem imbues the Code with special value
to private business, even absent any norm creating capabilities.
By virtue of the practical, business-oriented aspect of the private
international community, these corporations have a keen interest
in what nations do. The questions confronted by private international business transcend excursions along theory laden, label
strewn paths. Private business is concerned with ledgers, balance

sheets, investigator's reports, customs activities, and all the
sources of information about commercial counterfeiting; it is goal,
not label, oriented. The goal of private business is not to create
an international anticounterfeiting norm, but rather to determine
methods by which that problem can be eradicated.
The slight difference in the orientation of the public and private international legal and business communities imbues the
Code with a new significance. Even if it is not accorded any public international law labels, the Code can serve as a springboard
for achievement of the private international community's goals.
The Code symbolizes joint public and private commitment to exterminate a common enemy. On a practical level, the Code establishes information exchange provisions and requires minor
changes in internal customs procedures. Even if the Code is not
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labeled "norm creating," it will bridge the gap between public
and private international law and facilitate private businesses'
battle against counterfeiters.
The self-interest analysis in which all decision makers engage
promises a third level of international significance for the Code.
The simple existence of the Code will create normative pressure
in the international community. To borrow Professor D'Amato's
analogy, even if the Code does not "stop" the problem, it may be
perceived as a sign that anticounterfeiting programs are needed
to "slow down" counterfeiting.
Shari Dawn Otenick

